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Executive Summary  
 
U.S. efforts to promote the international expansion of nuclear energy through the Global 
Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) and other Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycle programs 
will result in a dramatic expansion of nuclear fuel cycle facilities in the United States.  
Demonstration Facilities, such as the Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility (AFCF), the 
Advanced Burner Reactor (ABR), and the Consolidated Fuel Treatment Center (CFTC) 
will use advanced nuclear and chemical process technologies that must incorporate 
increased proliferation resistance to enhance nuclear safeguards.   
 
The ASA-100 Project, “Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
Facilities,” commissioned by the NA-243 Office of NNSA, has been tasked with 
reviewing and developing advanced safeguards approaches for these demonstration 
facilities.  Because a goal of GNEP and other Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycle programs is 
developing and sharing proliferation-resistant nuclear technology and services with 
partner nations, the safeguards approaches considered are consistent with international 
safeguards as currently implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA).  
 
This second report in a series of three reviews possible safeguards approaches for the new 
transuranic (TRU) fuel fabrication processes to be deployed at AFCF – specifically, the 
ceramic TRU (MOX) fuel fabrication line and the metallic (pyroprocessing) line.  The 
most common TRU fuel has been fuel composed of mixed plutonium and uranium 
dioxide, referred to as “MOX”.  However, under the Advanced Fuel Cycle projects 
custom-made fuels with higher contents of neptunium, americium, and curium may also 
be produced to evaluate if these “minor actinides” can be effectively burned and 
transmuted through irradiation in the ABR.  A third and final report in this series will 
evaluate and review the advanced safeguards approach options for the ABR. 
 
In reviewing and developing the advanced safeguards approach for the new TRU fuel 
fabrication processes envisioned for AFCF, the existing international (IAEA) safeguards 
approach at the Plutonium Fuel Production Facility (PFPF) and the conceptual approach 
planned for the new J-MOX facility in Japan have been considered as a starting point of 
reference.  The pyro-metallurgical reprocessing and fuel fabrication process at EBR-II 
near Idaho Falls also provided insight for safeguarding the additional metallic 
pyroprocessing fuel fabrication line planned for AFCF.  
 
This study concludes that an effective safeguards approach for the new ceramic TRU-
MOX and metallic TRU-fuel fabrication lines planned for AFCF could be based on 
advanced safeguards measures, as have been applied to PFPF, and as planned for J-MOX 
in Japan. In principle, it should be easier to safeguard these lines, because of the 
relatively low throughput of 1 THM TRU fuel per year per line, compared to the 
industrial-scale capacity of PFPF and J-MOX (apx. 40 MTHM and 100 MTHM, 
respectively).  However, there will be significant challenges in safeguarding both TRU 
fuel fabrication lines, because of the experimental and flexible nature of the AFCF, as 
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well as the complexity of the conceptual fuel fabrication processes (as currently 
designed). 
 
This report identifies the technical challenges and development “needs” for safeguarding 
these new TRU fuel fabrication processes.   Many of the “needs” identified for 
safeguarding the new reprocessing processes are relevant here as well, although the TRU 
fuel fabrication processes present additional safeguards challenges that differ from the 
reprocessing processes. These needs are: 
 
• Develop non-destructive assay (NDA) methods to accurately measure the 
plutonium (Pu) and actinide content in TRU fuel fabrication process materials and 
finished TRU fuel assemblies.  (This is currently complicated by the presence of 
other “minor actinides”.  These methods should be capable of detecting “partial 
defects in accordance with current IAEA criteria, i.e. having an accuracy of 
approximately +/-5% total Pu and other actinides.)  To demonstrate these methods, 
samples of the TRU materials planned for the future facilities will have to be 
prepared for testing purposes. 
 
• Many of these NDA methods or systems will need to be designed “in-line” to 
measure the materials in the process and during transfer from one fabrication step 
to the next, to facilitate the timely verification of nuclear material transfers and the 
taking of process inventory.  These methods should be amenable to remote data 
transmission to permit “remote monitoring” of the facility for more efficient 
safeguards.  Many of the NDA techniques are dependent on the geometry of the 
container or assay station.  So, once the assay techniques are selected, the assay 
stations or TRU objects to be assayed will need to be “mocked-up” to prove the 
techniques. 
 
• Make greater use of automated, unattended/remote monitoring systems for 
collecting safeguards data, while cooperating with the facility owner/operator and 
national authorities to ensure protection of proprietary information. And develop a 
more completely automated and integrated safeguards data collect and review 
system for analyzing process and on-line assay data and surveillance imagery to 
support verification of the nuclear material transfers, inventory, and operational 
status of the facility. 
 
• Establish an active dialogue with the IAEA to negotiate a more flexible 
interpretation of the IAEA Department of Safeguards SGTS Policy #20, 
concerning the joint use of equipment for safeguards purposes.  The current 
interpretation is very restrictive and limits the ability of the IAEA to use a broad 
range of existing plant instruments because of the supposed need to derive 
independent safeguards conclusions from these instruments.  It is proposed that 
this strict interpretation should be applied only to those instruments of primary 
safeguards importance – and not to the extensive array of plant instruments, which 
could still provide complementary data of safeguards relevance regarding 
operation of the facility. 
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• Cooperate with the facility owner/operator and national authorities to try to design 
safeguards requirements and equipment into the conceptual design at the earliest 
stages of the conceptual design of the facility. 
 
• Make the inspection regime more efficient by using randomized short-notice 
inspections, applying a “statistical process control” approach to verification of the 
reprocessing facilities rather than a scheduled systematic verification of all major 
transfers of plutonium-bearing materials.  For this kind of approach to be effective 
the facility operator would need to declare the major activities involving nuclear 
material in advance. It would also be more efficient and effective to apply this 
approach on a site, rather than facility level. 
 
• Discuss the novel safeguards approaches presented in this report in an international 
forum, and in the most promising cases, test them to determine if they would 
improve the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguarding a modern TRU-fuel 
fabrication facility.   
 
• The conceptual process schematics for both the TRU-MOX and metallic (pyro) 
fuel fabrication processes planned for AFCF are very complex, incorporating a 
number of additional acid dissolution, solvent extraction and denitration process 
steps – many of which are not normally seen in modern TRU-MOX fabrication 
plants. Consequently, there is a need to review these conceptual processes to see if 
they can be simplified – for the sake of stable process operations as well as to 
facilitate nuclear material safeguards. 
 
• The conceptual process schematics for the processes noted above also do not 
indicate dedicated storage areas for Pu and TRU-bearing process materials such as 
feed material in process, sintered pellets, fabricated fuel rods, or finished 
assemblies.  There is a need to review the current conceptual designs to see that 
such secure storage areas are designed into the process to facilitate stable process 
operation and to provide nuclear material inventory points that will facilitate 
nuclear material inventory stock taking. 
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1. Background 
 
As the United States works to promote the global expansion of nuclear power through its 
Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) and other Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
programs, the nuclear fuel cycle in the United States is expected to expand substantially.  
New facilities will be constructed employing advanced nuclear and chemical process 
technologies.  In addition, it is envisioned that these new Demonstration Facilities will be 
designed to be inherently easier to safeguard and more proliferation-resistant.  Two of the 
main objectives of GNEP and Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycle programs are the recycle of 
nuclear fuel using new technologies to recover more energy and minimize long-term 
radioactive waste, and to reduce proliferation risks through the use of these new 
“proliferation resistant” technologies.1  The facilities that will demonstrate this new 
proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel-cycle include the Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility 
(AFCF), the Advanced Burner Reactor (ABR), and the Consolidated Fuel Treatment 
Center (CFTC, formerly called ESD).2  
 
The ASA-100 Project, “Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
Facilities,” commissioned by the NA-243 Office of NNSA, has been tasked with 
reviewing and developing advanced safeguards approaches for these Demonstration 
Facilities. The United States has consistently demonstrated its support for international 
safeguards, as evidenced by the US government having over 280 nuclear facilities listed 
on the Eligible Facility List (EFL) under its Voluntary Offer (Safeguards) Agreement 
with the IAEA.  It is likely that these Demonstration Facilities would be placed on this 
list as well.  Furthermore, the development and sharing of proliferation-resistant nuclear 
technology and services is a GNEP and Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycle cornerstone.  
Therefore, the conceptual safeguards approaches developed in this study are consistent 
with international (IAEA) safeguards and practices. 
 
This second report in a series of three reviews possible safeguards approaches for the new 
transuranic (TRU) fuel fabrication processes to be deployed at AFCF – specifically, the 
ceramic TRU fuel fabrication line and the metallic (pyroprocessing) line.  Advanced 
safeguards approaches for the new reprocessing processes to be deployed at AFCF and 
CFTC had been addressed in the first report in this series.3  To date, the most common 
TRU fuel has been fuel composed of mixed plutonium and uranium dioxide, also referred 
to as “MOX”.  However, under the Advanced Fuel Cycle projects being considered, 
custom-made fuels with higher contents of neptunium, americium, and curium may also 
be produced to evaluate if these “minor actinides” can be effectively burned and 
transmuted through irradiation in the ABR.  A third and final report in this series will 
evaluate and review the advanced safeguards approach options for the ABR. 
 
In reviewing and developing the advanced safeguards approach for the new TRU fuel 
fabrication processes envisioned for AFCF, the existing international (IAEA) safeguards 
approach at the Plutonium Fuel Production Facility (PFPF) in Japan has been considered 
as a starting point of reference.  The conceptual safeguards approach developed for the 
new J-MOX Facility to be built at the Rokkashomura Site in northern Japan has also been 
considered.  The pyro-metallurgical reprocessing and fuel fabrication process at EBR-II 
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near Idaho Falls provided insight for safeguarding the additional metallic pyroprocessing 
fuel fabrication line planned for AFCF. 
 
The safeguards objective addressed by the approaches presented in this report is 
consistent with the goals of the IAEA; specifically, the timely detection of the diversion 
of one significant quantity (SQ) of nuclear material.4 The over-arching objective then is 
the detection of the diversion of 8 kilograms of separated plutonium within one month of 
diversion.♣  It should be understood from this study that safeguards measures also apply 
to uranium, although to a lesser extent, since the uranium used in fabricating TRU-fuel is 
“indirect-use” material with a one year “timeliness” detection goal.∗  Since GNEP and the 
GNEP demonstration facilities strive to improve proliferation resistance and nuclear 
safeguards measures, safeguards may also be applied to alternative nuclear materials 
“ANM” in the future, such as neptunium and americium.   
 
Traditionally, safeguards have depended primarily on nuclear material accountancy (e.g. 
accountability), supplemented with containment and surveillance.  It is well recognized 
that safeguards objectives in a facility with a large nuclear material throughput cannot be 
met by nuclear material accountancy alone. To address this weakness, the conceptual 
approaches considered in this report introduce other safeguards measures in addition to 
accountancy that, in combination, will allow the inspecting authority to meet the 
safeguards objective. 
 
 
2. Description of TRU Fuel Fabrication Facilities and Processes 
 
2. a. Reference Facility – Plutonium Fuel Production Facility (PFPF) 
 
The Plutonium Fuel Production Facility (PFPF) is owned and operated by the Japan 
Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA, formerly called JNC and PNC) and is located at the 
JAEA Tokaimura nuclear site.  The facility has a nominal capacity of producing 40 
tonnes of plutonium-bearing mixed oxide (MOX) fuels and has been in operation since 
circa 1988.5  MOX fuel is a nuclear fuel consisting of a blended mixture of UO2 and 
PuO2 ceramic powder. Other MOX-fuel plants have been subject to IAEA safeguards in 
the world, but PFPF is a good point of reference, because the safeguards systems in the 
facility have been subject to extensive modernization by JAEA with the support of the 
national inspectorate, the Japan Safeguards Office (JSGO).  Many of the non-destructive 
assay systems being considered for the conceptual J-MOX facility planned for the 
Rokkashomura Reprocessing Site were developed originally at PFPF.  Many of these 
systems have been further developed to facilitate remote data transmission, so that the 
IAEA could remotely monitor the facility to improve the efficiency of the safeguards 
inspection regime – thus permitting remote verification of nuclear material at shorter 
intervals than the prescribed timeliness detection goal. 
                                                
♣ There are currently discussions at the IAEA about relaxing the timeliness detection goal for MOX 
material and fuel in a country under “Integrated Safeguards”. 
∗ “Direct-use” and “indirect use” nuclear material and their respective timeliness goals for the detection of 
diversion are as per the IAEA Safeguards Glossary. 
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PFPF was designed to produce MOX for light water reactors (LWRs), plutonium-bearing 
fuel for the Advanced Thermal Reactor (ATR) Fugen and MOX for the Japanese fast 
breeder reactors (FBRs) Joyo and Monju. 6  Consequently, the facility has two separate 
ceramic MOX fuel fabrication lines – one for ATR and LWR MOX fuel and one for FBR 
fuel.  The capacity of the ATR/LWR ceramic MOX fuel line is approximately 35 
MTHM∗ and the FBR line is approximately 4 MTHM per year.  Both processes use 
ceramic MOX fuel technology developed from pioneering work done at the Plutonium 
Fuel Fabrication Facility (PFFF) on the JNC Tokai site, which started operation in 1972.  
Following the sodium fire at Monju in 1995, PFPF has produced primarily MOX fuel for 
LWRs.  A photograph of PFPF is shown in Figure-1 and a simplified process flow 
schematic of the ceramic MOX-fuel fabrication process is shown in Figure-2.  This 
diagram also shows the principle key measurement points for plutonium assay by NDA, 
as well as points being considered for containment and surveillance for the new J-MOX 
facility. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Photograph of PFPF (Japan) 
                                                
∗ MTHM is nominally the combined mass of uranium and plutonium in the MOX fuel, expressed in terms 
of metric tonnes. 
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Figure 2: Simplified Process Flow Schematic of 
The Pu-MOX Fuel Fabrication Line at PFPF and J-MOX 
 
The following is a simple description of the process.  MOX powder produced at the 
JAEA Plutonium Conversion Demonstration Facility “PCDF”, or shipped from foreign 
suppliers, is received in canisters that contain up to four cans of MOX powder.  The 
canisters are assayed by NDA and weighed to determine Pu content.  The canisters are 
placed into a storage vault or unpacked in a plutonium glove box for further processing.  
During processing, the plutonium content in the MOX powder is adjusted to the product 
specification by blending with depleted uranium (DU).  The final plutonium content has 
varied in the past from 2% to 30% wt, depending on the fuel produced.  The MOX 
powder may be milled to improve the physical properties of the ceramic powder.  After 
blending to the final product specification, the MOX powder is pressed into green pellets 
and sintered to a high refractory ceramic oxide pellet that will retain stability and shape 
during the high temperature thermal cycling in a nuclear reactor.  The sintered pellets are 
ground to the final pellet specifications and stored in “pellet boats” in an automated MOX 
fuel pellet store.  The sintered pellets are removed from the store automatically as needed 
and sent to the rod stacking station to be made into MOX fuel rods.  The rods are 
pressurized with helium gas and the tips are welded closed with an automated tungsten 
inert gas (TIG) welder.  The rods undergo quality control inspection for nuclear material 
content, surface roughness, length, diameter, straightness, etc. and are then stored in the 
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automated fuel rod storage area.  Later these rods are removed from storage and 
transferred to the fuel fabrication area to be assembled into finished MOX fuel 
assemblies. The MOX fuel assemblies are placed into secured storage or are loaded into 
MOX fuel shipping containers and sealed for shipping to Japanese customers.  The 
receipts and shipments of MOX-bearing materials are subject to verification by the IAEA 
using custom designed NDA equipment.  The plutonium content of these materials is 
determined by gamma spectroscopy and coincident neutron counting.  Samples for 
destructive analysis are also collected by the IAEA from the process materials as 
required.  Because the timeliness goal for separated plutonium-bearing materials is one 
month, the facility and its inventory of MOX materials is subject to rigorous inspection 
by the IAEA once a month.  The most relevant aspects of PFPF as a point of reference for 
developing a safeguards approach for the new TRU fuel fabrication processes to be 
deployed at AFCF are: 
• Most stages of the fuel fabrication process are highly automated, and are 
completely enclosed in alpha-containment glove box enclosures, 
• The key process material storage areas and vaults are highly automated and 
“hardened” for physical protection, 
• Customized equipment has been designed for assaying the MOX materials in 
various stages and containers in the process, through to the final form as a finished 
assembly, 
• Safeguards NDA and surveillance data collection is typically unattended and is 
amenable to remote data transmission, 
• Specialized glove box assay systems have been developed to survey work in-
process MOX materials that are still in the glove boxes to determine in process 
“hold-up”. 
 
The current safeguards approach at PFPF will be described in more detail in Section-3.   
 
2. b. Reference Facility - J-MOX 
 
Based on the successful operating experience of PFPF, the Japanese commercial 
consortium Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited (JNFL) is planning to construct and operate a 
large MOX fuel fabrication plant on the site of the Rokkashomura Reprocessing Plant 
(RRP), which will be called “J-MOX”.   The facility will process and fabricate MOX-fuel 
for LWRs using the ceramic MOX fuel fabrication technology employed at PFPF.  
However, this facility will be larger, having a capacity of 100 MTHM MOX fuel per year 
and will be dedicated strictly to the production of MOX fuel for LWRs and will not 
produce MOX fuel for FBRs or for the Japanese ATR Fugen.7   Construction of the 
facility is planned for October of 2007, with completion and start-up projected for 
October, 2012.  The facility will consist of four levels and will process 50% wt. Pu MOX 
powder from RRP, blending with depleted or natural uranium to fabricate MOX fuel for 
LWRs having a nominal Pu content on the order of 2% – 16 % (of heavy metal).  Even 
though the J-MOX facility has yet to be constructed and there has been no experience as 
yet safeguarding the facility, the similarities with the LWR MOX fuel fabrication line at 
PFPF are so similar as to warrant close comparison of the safeguards approaches for the 
two facilities.  Also, the safeguards approach and equipment that had been developed for 
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PFPF has evolved further for application at J-MOX – so mention of these evolutions is 
worthwhile to consider where the safeguarding of TRU fuels is going. 
 
As stated previously, fundamentally, the MOX fuel fabrication process flow is the same 
as that shown in the simplified process diagram for PFPF in Figure-2.  The J-MOX 
facility will be divided into process sectors according the process operation (powder 
processing, pellet processing, scrap processing, rod fabrication and final assembly, etc.).  
This will facilitate the performing of short-notice random inspections (SNRI) by the 
IAEA to meet the goal of timely detecting possible diversions of plutonium and other 
nuclear material.  The fabrication process steps are as shown in Figure-2, although there 
will be considerable more process equipment than at PFPF to meet the higher fuel 
fabrication throughput of 100 MTHM per year MOX fuel.  It is also expected that the 
facility will be more centrally controlled for process control and nuclear criticality safety.   
 
The J-MOX safeguards approach will be described in more detail along with that for 
PFPF in Section-3.  However, the most striking features regarding the safeguards 
approach is the extensive use of customized NDA equipment for assaying the MOX 
process materials and finished assemblies for determining the content of plutonium, the 
use of hardened secured locations for storing MOX process materials and finished fuel 
assemblies, and the extensive use of containment and surveillance to maintain the 
“continuity of knowledge” (CoK) over the MOX materials at all times. 
 
2. c Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility – Ceramic TRU (MOX) Fuel Line 
 
The Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility (AFCF) will be a conceptual research facility to 
develop and test new nuclear fuel reprocessing and fuel fabrication flowsheets and 
technology.8  The aqueous line of the facility will demonstrate and test aqueous 
separations processes that will recover uranium, plutonium, and actinides from spent fuel, 
which will then be fed to the fuel fabrication line to be made into advanced transuranic 
mixed-oxide (TRU-MOX) fuel.  This fuel can be rightly called TRU-mixed oxide, 
because it will consist of a mixture of uranium and plutonium-dioxide, as well as 
neptunium, americium and curium oxide.♦ One of the goals under the Advanced Nuclear 
Fuel Cycle projects is the recycle of the long-term alpha-emitting actinides into fuel 
assemblies for burning and transmutation into less long-lived fission products.  So, in 
principle, the ceramic TRU-fuel fabrication line at AFCF would be another “MOX” fuel 
fabrication line and the international safeguards approach and methods that have been 
used by the IAEA at PFPF and planned for J-MOX would also be applicable to the 
ceramic TRU fuel fabrication line at AFCF. The feed material for the ceramic TRU-fuel 
fabrication line will come from the aqueous separations line at AFCF, which will be 
designed to process 25 MTHM per year. Initially, as LWR fuel is reprocessed, this will 
produce approximately 250 kg Pu per year.  At an average TRU content of 25% in the 
TRU fuel, this equates to approximately 1 tonne of TRU-MOX fuel per year, initially.  
However, the fuel fabrication capacity could be increased if stocks of Pu-MOX are sent 
                                                
♦ The question of incorporating the minor actinides into the TRU-fuel versus fabricating americium and 
curium targets separately is still being considered – although the safeguards measures for both cases would 
be comparable. 
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to AFCF from other storage locations.  For the sake of the following discussion, the fuel 
fabrication capacity of the ceramic TRU fuel fabrication line is assumed to be on the 
order of 1 – 4 tonnes of TRU-MOX fuel per year, with a target to produce up to 8 lead 
test assemblies “LTA” for the ABR per year. 
 
A simplified diagram of the ceramic TRU-fuel fabrication schematic for AFCF is shown 
in Figure-3.9   However, it should be noted that this has been simplified considerably 
from the current conceptual schematic and that several processing steps have been 
combined to facilitate a comparison between this TRU-MOX fuel process and the 
reference Pu-MOX process depicted in Figure-2.    
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Simplified Flow Schematic of 
Ceramic TRU-MOX Fuel Fabrication Line at AFCF 
 
A summary of the conceptual ceramic TRU-fuel fabrication process planned for AFCF is 
as follows:  TRU/plutonium product will be removed from the storage vault on site or 
will be received from off-site storage.  This material will be mixed and combined in a 
dissolver to meet the specified transuranic and isotopic content desired for the TRU-
MOX fuel.  The mixed TRU material will be blended, dissolved and denitrated and 
calcined to a mixed TRU-dioxide.  This material will be further blended with UO2 to the 
nominal composition of the MOX fuel to be made.  The blended TRU-MOX powder will  
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be milled to the desired particle size and pressed into green (un-sintered) TRU-MOX 
pellets.  TRU MOX powder, pellets that do not meet specification and other TRU scrap 
material will be recycled through a wet-scrap recovery process, or returned to the 
aqueous separations (reprocessing) line at AFCF.  Green TRU-MOX pellets will be 
sintered in a sintering furnace and ground to the final dimensions for the finished pellets.  
These pellets will be quality-control inspected and loaded into zircaloy tubes to make 
finished TRU-MOX fuel pins (or rods).  The fuel rods will also be inspected and 
assembled in a fuel fixture to make the final assembly.  The finished TRU-MOX 
assemblies will be stored in a secured area, awaiting shipment or transfer to the 
Advanced Burner Reactor (ABR).  TRU-waste and contaminated materials will be 
collected and packaged for assay, prior to storage on-site in a TRU-waste storage 
location.    The safeguards approach and options proposed for this process will be 
described in more detail in Sections-4 and 6.  In general, the TRU-MOX material will be 
weighed and assayed upon being fed to the fuel fabrication process.  Containers of TRU-
MOX, containing MOX-powder, pellets, and rods will be assayed by dedicated detectors, 
and will be characterized as required by grab samples and destructive analysis (DA).  In 
simplest terms, the safeguards approach will be verification of the nuclear material 
received, verification of the nuclear material fabricated into finished assemblies, 
verification of material between major process steps including waste streams, and 
periodic verification of the nuclear material in the process inventory.  The primary 
safeguards focus will be to verify the plutonium, and to a lesser extent the uranium – but 
since significant amounts of other actinides will be incorporated into the TRU-MOX fuel, 
there will also be a need to verify and account for the neptunium and americium. 
 
The process as described sounds straight-forward, and if the fuel were ceramic uranium 
fuel, this would be the case.  But the following issues will make the operation and 
safeguarding of the ceramic TRU Fuel fabrication line at AFCF more challenging: 
 
• Plutonium and the other actinides are highly radiotoxic and these materials will 
have to be handled in completely enclosed gloveboxes. Only after the fuel rods 
have been welded, cleaned and inspected is it likely that the nuclear material will 
be removed from a glove box (in the form of a fuel rod); 
• The final plutonium and actinide composition in the TRU-MOX fuel is highly 
variable, depending on the purified nuclear materials available and the 
transmutation experiments planned for the ABR.  Consequently, it is difficult to 
optimize the design of assay equipment to determine the actinide content, if the 
composition of the fuel is not well defined prior to development of the assay 
equipment  (i.e. if you do not know what exactly the nuclear material is, it is 
difficult to accurately measure and safeguard);  
• There is some experience making experimental assemblies with slightly increased 
levels of neptunium, americium and curium and targets of these materials, but not 
a great deal of industrial experience – so the fabrication and processing technology 
is less developed than for conventional Pu/U-MOX; 
• The conceptual ceramic TRU fuel fabrication line flow-sheet for AFCF is 
extremely complicated, incorporating a number of dissolution, denitration, and 
flexible wet scrap-recovery steps that are not normally part of a dedicated uranium 
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or MOX fuel fabrication line.  These steps may be required, because of the 
experimental and flexible nature of AFCF, but such process steps are likely to 
introduce operational problems in the fuel fabrication line.  Processes that are 
subject to frequent shutdown are very difficult to safeguard efficiently; 
• The conceptual ceramic TRU fuel fabrication flow sheet does not indicate the 
presence of significant MOX-material storage areas, yet it is common practice that 
such storage areas are necessary to maintain the process flow.  It is likely that 
storage areas will need to be created for TRU/Pu feed powder, sintered TRU-MOX 
pellets, and TRU-MOX rods.  If such storage areas are not provided, there may be 
an undesirable accumulation of TRU-MOX materials staged in the glove boxes at 
the various processing steps, which could constitute a nuclear criticality hazard, as 
well as an increased process hold-up that would need to be regularly verified for 
nuclear safeguards. 
 
Regarding the variable fuel composition, the TRU-MOX fuel will be produced from 
TRU-product materials recovered in the aqueous separations process at AFCF that is 
expected to use a variant of the UREX+ process.  Consequently the TRU feed for the 
fuel fabrication process may contain any of the elements shown for the TRU 
(Reprocessing) Product Stream in Table-1. 
 
Table 1:  
Comparison of TRU-Products from the AFCF Separations Line  
To be fed to the TRU-MOX Fuel Line 
 
Notes: (1) In all cases, iodine is removed as an off-gas from the dissolution process. 
            (2) Processes are designed for the generation of no liquid high-level wastes. 
 
U: uranium (removed in order to reduce the mass and volume of high-level waste) 
Tc: technetium (long-lived fission product, prime contributor to long-term dose at Yucca Mtn.) 
Cs/Sr: cesium and strontium (primary short-term heat generators; repository impact 
TRU: transuranic elements (Pu: Plutonium, Np: neptunium, Am: americium, Cm: curium) 
Ln: lanthanide (rare earth) fission products 
FP: fission products other than cesium, strontium, technetium, iodine, and the lanthanides 
All FP: fission products plus lanthanides 
 
Process Prod. # 1 Prod. # 2 Prod. #3 TRU Product Prod. #5 Prod. #6 Prod. #7 
UREX+1 U Tc Cs/Sr TRU + Ln FP   
UREX+1A U Tc Cs/Sr TRU All FP   
UREX+1B U Tc Cs/Sr U + TRU All FP   
UREX+2 U Tc Cs/Sr Pu + Np Am + Cm + Ln FP  
UREX+2A U Tc Cs/Sr U + Pu + Np Am + Cm + Ln       FP  
UREX+3 U Tc Cs/Sr Pu + Np Am + Cm All FP  
UREX+3A U Tc Cs/Sr U + Pu + Np Am + Cm All FP  
UREX+4 U Tc Cs/Sr Pu + Np Am Cm All FP 
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Regarding waste handling and packaging, the processes are not well defined at this stage 
for the AFCF TRU-MOX fuel fabrication line. However, it is believed that the assay 
techniques would be comparable to the NDA techniques used at PFPF to assay waste 
cubes and TRU-waste drums for plutonium and actinide content. 
 
And finally, the design and construction of AFCF will need to be flexible and adaptable 
to accommodate the research and testing requirements specified by the GNEP or other 
advanced nuclear fuel cycle programs. Therefore, the facility design will accommodate 
changes as required to support the reprocessing experiments.  It will also have extensive 
remote maintenance capabilities: remotely operated cranes and master-slave or servo-
robotic manipulators and glove-boxes. The flexibility of the facility configuration will be 
an additional challenge in safeguarding AFCF, especially when verifying the facility 
design information. 
 
2. d.  Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility – Pyro (Metallic) TRU-Fuel Line 
  
The AFCF Pyroprocessing fuel fabrication line is still in the early stages of design, but a 
simplified schematic of the conceptual process is shown in Figure-4, below.  The process 
is designed to produce metallic, as opposed to ceramic, TRU fuel for recycle to the 
Advanced Burner Reactor.  The feed stock will be metal ingots containing transuranic 
elements, plutonium and uranium (TRU/Pu/U) from the pyro processing line at AFCF, or 
TRU-MOX from the TRU-MOX fabrication line or other storage locations.  The facility 
will be designed to fabricate 1 THM of fuel per year.   
 
Figure 4: Simplified Flow Diagram of the 
Metallic (Pyro) Fuel Fabrication Process at AFCF 
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A conceptual layout of the pyroprocess and fuel fabrication part of AFCF is shown in 
Figure-5, below.10 
 
Figure 5:   
Conceptual Layout of the AFCF Pyroprocess 
(Pyro-Reprocessing and Metallic Fuel Fabrication Line) 
 
 
A description of the process is as follows.  The metal fuel production concept involves 
receipt of casting feedstock to make U-TRU-Zr metallic fuel slugs using an injection 
casting process. The current estimate considers 45% TRU, 45% depleted uranium and 
10% zirconium.   As per the conceptual design, the TRU feedstock would likely come 
from the pyro process, but could also come from recovered oxide from the aqueous 
process line. The TRU feedstock consists of plutonium, americium, neptunium and 
curium, as well as, recycled U-TRU-Zr materials (casting heels, fuel slug end crops, out 
of specification fuel slugs, etc.). In the conceptual design, about half of the casting charge 
is eventually returned as feed for future castings, since more than half of this recycled 
material is the casting heel (material left in the bottom of the crucible after casting). 
Uranium and zirconium are added to make up the desired composition. These could be 
supplied fresh or recycled from the aqueous recovery process of the AFCF.  As noted, the 
facility design includes the possibility to receive feed material in the oxide as well as the 
metallic form. However, oxide feed material would require conversion to the metal. This 
conversion process requires fluorination of the oxide and reduction to the metal form. 
From this process, there will be issues with handling additional crucible residues and 
casting wastes. 
 
The mixed feedstock is induction melted and injection cast into molds, cooled, removed 
from the mold and sheared to length. Three of these fuel slugs would be required to 
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produce a rod for an ABR lead test assembly “LTA”. The slugs are stacked into a 
stainless steel jacket, settled into liquid sodium in the jacket and then the jacket is sealed 
by welding. The nearly finished fuel rod is then treated to ensure a good thermal bond is 
created between the fuel and the stainless cladding (by the liquid sodium in the fuel rod).  
The fabrication process is considered relatively simple and high yields are expected. Poor 
yield batches, if they occur, can be recycled in to the casting feed. Shortcomings of the 
process, as experienced to date with EBR-II fuel, are that excessive waste is produced 
during de-molding and americium is expected to volatilize during the casting process. 
The current scheme is to use quartz molds for fuel slug casting. The castings are retrieved 
from the mold by breaking the quartz molds. The shards of broken quartz become a waste 
stream. The molds, while coated with ZrO2 to prevent interaction between the molten fuel 
and the quartz, are also a source of unwanted impurities in the fuel especially in the fuel 
heel that remains in the crucible. An important research area is to eliminate the quartz 
mold and replace them with a reusable form. 
 
The main points regarding the process that have a bearing on safeguards are: 
 
Varied TRU Feed Receipts: the varied nature of the materials and the varied actinide 
content will present challenges for the application of NDA measurements. However, 
oxide receipts could be sampled and analyzed by DA techniques.  
 
Assay of TRU-Fuel Pins: individual fuel pins are cast from a molten metal in an 
induction heated crucible. The mix in the crucible must be controlled and known. 
Sampling and DA analysis of the molten metal in the crucible, along with the net weight 
of the melt, would allow verification of nuclear material content.  These data could be 
supplemented or alternated with NDA verification, but the NDA will be complicated by 
the minor actinides present. 
 
Crucible Heels and Waste: it is anticipated that a considerable heel will be left in the 
crucible and will be recycled with additional feed material, but there are also concerns 
about build-up of contaminates in these heels. Clearly there will be a need to clean the 
crucibles, dispose of failed crucibles that may have residual material, and measure the 
contents of the crucibles at inventory periods.  
 
Casting Waste: the metal TRU-fuel slug is cast in quartz molds. Upon cooling, the 
quartz is shattered to remove the cast fuel slug. The quartz shard is a waste form that will 
need to be verified by NDA to determine the amount of nuclear material in the waste. 
  
Feed Oxide Reduction Waste: The process for conversion of the oxides to metal 
involves fluorination of the oxides and reduction. This process also produces slag and 
crucible wastes. This process will probably handle a variety of compositions from TRU-
fuel to uranium and zirconium feed. The waste will have a variety of characteristic and 
composition requiring measurement development. 
 
In general, there is a lot less experience with the metallic TRU fuel fabrication process 
compared to the TRU-MOX fabrication process.  However, the metallic (pyro) process 
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was one of the first tested in an Integrated Fuel Cycle Center at the Experimental Breeder 
Reactor-II (EBR-II) in the mid 1960’s.11  So, there is considerable process experience 
with the process in handling small batches of metallic fuel for recycle to a test fast 
reactor.  However, there will have to be considerable development effort in safeguards 
methods and equipment for this part of this process.  
 
There are however, complications with the metallic fuel process as currently conceived.  
First, considerable care will have to be exercised in blending the TRU/Pu/U to the desired 
specifications, which could very well vary from batch to batch.  Secondly, the 
fluorination and reduction process for the potential TRU-MOX feed is a difficult 
corrosive process not easily managed in hot cells with remote handling for high-gamma 
radiation.  Thirdly, the scrap recovery process appears to be very complex, as noted 
above.  Finally, the metallic (pyro) process itself is a high-temperature process that 
normally corrodes the process equipment more aggressively than the TRU-MOX process.  
These process and operational issues are noted, because it is more challenging to 
safeguard the inventory of nuclear material in a process that is subject to frequent 
equipment breakdowns.  Nonetheless, the purpose of AFCF is to test and develop fuel 
reprocessing and fabrication flowsheets and to assess the “safeguard-ability” and 
proliferation resistance of such processes, so it is appropriate to evaluate this at AFCF.  
As imagined at this stage, the safeguards approach would be comparable to what has 
been discussed for the TRU-MOX fuel fabrication line at AFCF, as noted in the 
preceding Section, which will also be discussed in more detail in Section-5.  
  
A more detailed description of the pyroprocess is found in the references noted. 12, 13   
Even though the description of the process in those references is for a larger 
pyroprocessing line, the process steps at AFCF are expected to be very similar. 
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3. The Current International Safeguards Approach for the Reference 
Facilities (PFPF and J-MOX)  
 
The safeguards approaches for PFPF and J-MOX were developed in the context of an 
INFCIRC/153-type comprehensive safeguards agreement concluded between Japan and 
the IAEA.  The international safeguards approach applied to J-MOX is based 
predominantly on the same safeguards criteria and foundation as the approach applied to 
the JAEA PFPF plant in Tokaimura.14   This should be remembered when the application 
of international safeguards may be in a weapons state under a Voluntary Offer-type 
safeguards agreement with the IAEA, such as the United States.   Nonetheless, the fuel 
processes being considered for new TRU fuel fabrication facilities in the United States 
could ultimately be shared with Japan, and conceivably with other nations, where the 
application of international safeguards per comprehensive safeguards agreements would 
be required.   
 
The safeguards objective for PFPF and J-MOX is the timely detection of the diversion of 
1 significant quantity (SQ) of nuclear material.15  The over-arching safeguards objective 
then is the detection of the diversion of 8 kg of un-irradiated plutonium within one month 
of diversion.  Safeguards also apply to uranium, but to a lesser extent. 
 
The safeguards approach for PFPF and J-MOX is based on the traditional approach 
applied to all nuclear facilities in accordance with the IAEA safeguards agreement, which 
provides for:16 
 
• Defined Material Balance Areas (MBA) for nuclear material accounting 
• Defined Key Measurement Points (KMPs) for measuring the flow and 
inventory of nuclear material 
• Defined Strategic Points for containment and surveillance (C/S) and other 
verification measures 
• Nuclear Material Accountancy, supported by review of operating records and 
state reports 
• Annual Physical Inventory Verification (PIV)  
• Verification of domestic and international transfers of nuclear material 
• Statistical evaluation of the nuclear material balance to determine “Material 
Unaccounted for” (MUF) 
• Routine, (monthly) interim inventory verifications (IIVs) for the timely 
detection of possible diversion of nuclear material 
• Verification of facility design information 
• Verification of the operator’s measurement system 
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However, at PFPF it was realized that traditional safeguards measures alone based mainly 
on nuclear material accountancy would not meet the safeguards objective, so an approach 
was implemented with the following additional operating features and safeguards 
measures:17 
 
• An Advanced centralized Accountancy System (AAS) for the plant operator 
(JAEA), that can determine the nuclear material inventory within the facility 
at key measurement points and process stations to support verification by the 
inspectors, 
• Hardened secured vaults and semi-automated storage locations for MOX feed 
canisters, MOX pellets, MOX fuel rods and finished MOX fuel assemblies, 
• An Advanced Containment and Surveillance System (AC/S) that consists of 
several kinds of sensors, gamma-detectors, crane monitors, and surveillance 
cameras, combined with a super-fast image processing system to detect  
changes in the areas under surveillance, 
• Continuous, Unattended custom-designed non-destructive assay (NDA) 
systems to monitor and determine the plutonium content in the MOX feed 
canisters (PCAS), in the accountancy glove box (MAGB), through out the 
processing gloveboxes (GBAS), the fuel pin assay station (FPAS), and the 
MOX fuel assembly station (FAAS). 
• An Advanced Accountancy Verification System (AAVS) that makes use of 
near real-time accounting (NRTA) for the purpose of continuously monitoring 
the nuclear material in the process. 
• PFPF was designed with safeguards and physical protection in mind, being 
perhaps the first plutonium processing facility in the world in which the 
“Safeguards by Design” concept was implemented. 
 
In essence, the overall safeguards approach at PFPF is as follows: the MOX feed powder 
is verified at PFPF upon receipt, using NDA and by weighing the canister.  Since the 
MOX-bearing materials are relatively clean (virtually no fission products and the amount 
of Am-241 is well estimated based on the date of reprocessing), it is possible to 
accurately perform this assay based primarily on coincident-neutron counting and gamma 
spectroscopy. These receipts are also verified randomly by sampling for destructive 
analysis “DA”. This constitutes the plutonium “input” into the facility.  Once the MOX 
fuel assemblies are fabricated they are verified by NDA and by determination of the 
“active fuel length” at the end of the process.  Together with the verification of the MOX-
bearing waste materials, this constitutes the facility plutonium “output”.  In order to meet 
the timeliness goal for detecting a possible diversion of nuclear material within one 
month, the facility is inspected by IAEA inspectors monthly.  During this time, the 
inspectors download the extensive array of unattended NDA and surveillance systems 
that monitor feed and process material transfers and compare to the facility operator’s 
declarations to verify that all is (or is not) as declared by the operator. To quantify the 
MOX material that is not readily accessible in the form of MOF feed, process powder, 
pellets, or rods, customized glove box assay systems (GBAS) have been developed that 
can be moved into place around randomly selected glove boxes containing large amounts 
of MOX materials in process.  These systems are very large coincident neutron counting 
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systems that can be positioned and raised to cover the front and back sides of very tall 
MOX process glove boxes.  Containment and surveillance systems (redundant video 
cameras and electronic and wire seals) are used to monitor the CoK of MOX feed, 
materials in the process and finished MOX assemblies.  Many such systems are 
permanently installed, although some are deployed by the IAEA inspectors specifically to 
sequester MOX materials during the monthly interim inspection verifications (IIV) and 
annual physical inventory verification (PIV). The inspectors verification of nuclear 
material received, shipped, and the resident inventories is further compared with the 
national (state) declarations for inventory changes and with the facility operator’s 
operating records to determine consistency.  Additional safeguards measures such as 
periodically verifying the facility design information, collecting environmental samples 
and performing “Complementary Access” under the Additional Protocol are also used to 
confirm that the facility is being used as declared and that there are no undeclared nuclear 
material and/or activities.   As a further safeguards enhancement, many of the unattended 
NDA and surveillance systems at PFPF have been modified to permit remote 
transmission (“Remote Monitoring”) of the safeguards data to the IAEA regional office 
in Tokyo for timely evaluation by the inspectors residing in Japan. 
 
The safeguards approach envisioned for J-MOX is very similar in principle to the 
safeguards approach applied at PFPF. However, the following enhancements and 
additional measures are being incorporated:18 
• The process will be divided into sectors to facilitate short-notice random 
inspections (SNRI) by the IAEA, 
• Extensive use of unattended NDA and surveillance systems will be used to verify 
100% of the MOX material flows between sectors, 
• More extensive use of video surveillance will be used to monitor key MOX 
material storage vaults and areas, 
• All safeguards systems will accommodate automated facility operation (i.e. will 
not necessitate the operator to shutdown the process monthly to accommodate the 
activities performed for monthly verification, 
• All MOX materials (MOX feed, process powder, pellets, rods and finished 
assemblies) will be measured in the process, 
• The safeguards verification system will be unattended, i.e. data for verification of 
the MOX material will be collected automatically and remotely transmitted to a 
dedicated review station, 
• There will be some jointly-shared safeguards equipment, 
• All safeguards systems will include features to permit authentication by the IAEA, 
including instrument validation, software validation, and validation of data 
collected by unattended systems, 
• All unattended NDA and surveillance systems will be amenable to “remote 
monitoring”, potentially for data transmission to the IAEA regional office in 
Tokyo, 
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• An On-Site Laboratory will process samples for destructive analysis (DA) to 
determine plutonium content and to determine potential measurement bias, in a 
measurement control program for the on-line NDA measurements, 
• Early and detailed declaration of Facility Design Information (DI) by the national 
authorities (JSGO) will facilitate design information verification (DIV) by the 
IAEA, 
• Very close communication between the IAEA, the facility operator (JNFL), the 
national nuclear inspectorate (JSGO), and the technical support organization 
(NMCC) will facilitate the effective implementation of safeguards, 
• A Data Collection and Evaluation System (DC&E) will be provided to facilitate 
the centralized integration and initial evaluation of the safeguards data. 
 
A summary of the custom designed safeguards systems being developed and 
constructed for J-MOX is shown below in Table-2: 
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Table-2: Safeguards Equipment Planned for J-MOX∗ 
Equipment 
Abbreviation 
Equipment Name 
(Quantity) 
Remarks Provider of 
Eqpt.(Supplier)♥ 
IPCA Improved Plutonium 
Canister Assay System (1) 
Unattended  
n, γ-Detectors &  
ID Camera 
JSGO (LANL) 
IPLC IPCA Load Cell (1) Unattended load cell IAEA 
DCPD Directional Canister 
Passage Detector (3) 
Unattended  
n-Detectors 
IAEA (LANL) 
DMOS Digital Multi-camera 
Optical Surveillance 
System (6) 
Surveillance Cameras 
(20 estd.) 
IAEA 
(Canberra/Aquila) 
IMCG Inspector Multi-Channel 
Analyzer 2000 with 
Germanium Detector (1) 
Attended  
γDetector/Analyzer 
IAEA 
(Canberra/Aquila) 
AISV Advanced Inventory 
Sample Verif. Sys.(1) 
Attended  
n, γ−Detectors 
JSGO (LANL) 
AMGB Advanced Material 
Accountancy Glove Box 
Assay System (9) 
Unattended  
n,γ−Detectors &  
ID Reader 
IAEA (LANL) 
PSMC Plutonium Scrap 
Multiplicity Counter (1) 
Unattended  
n-Detectors  
JNFL (LANL) 
GUAM Glove Box Unattended 
Monitoring System (1) 
Unattended  
n-Detectors  
JNFL (LANL) 
AFPA Advanced Fuel Pin Assay 
System (2) 
Unattended  
n, γ-Detectors & ID 
IAEA (LANL) 
AFPM Advanced Fuel Pin 
Magazine Assay System 
Unattended  
n-Detectors &  
ID Camera 
IAEA (LANL) 
 
AFAS Advanced Fuel Assembly 
Assay System(2) 
Unattended  
n-Detector & ID cam 
JSGO (LANL) 
“SCVS” “Shipping Cask 
Verification System” (1) 
Laser Reflectometer IAEA 
WPAS Waste Package Assay 
System (1) 
Attended  
nDetector/Analyzer 
JNFL (LANL) 
EBAL Electronic Balance (4) Attended  JNFL 
DC&E Centralized Data 
Collection & Eval. Sys. 
Design TBD IAEA 
                                                
∗ JSGO is the Japanese Safeguards Office, the national nuclear safeguards inspectorate in Japan.  JNFL is 
Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd., the owner/operator of the J-MOX facility. 
♥ Supplier of Equipment, where known. LANL is the Los Alamos National Laboratory, in the United 
States. 
 Authentication method for the device to be determined (TBD). 
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The basic features of the equipment are as noted in the remarks field above.  The majority 
of the NDA systems used for verifying the plutonium content of MOX materials have 
used coincident neutron counting, together with high resolution gamma spectroscopy.  
Gamma spectroscopy is used to determine the presence and relative proportion of 
isotopes of Pu, U, Am, etc., while the coincident neutron counters are used to determine 
the effective mass of Pu-240 present in the material assayed.  Having both pieces of 
information for a calibrated geometry allows the safeguards inspectors to determine the 
total mass of total plutonium and indirectly the amount of uranium and other actinides 
present.19 20 21 22 This technique works well for relatively clean MOX and plutonium-
bearing materials.  However, this technique becomes challenged when trying to assay 
scrap and waste materials.  For this reason, the Plutonium Scrap Multiplicity Counter 
(PMSC) was developed to more accurately determine the plutonium content in a mixed 
matrix such as waste.  It is also important to note that the future TRU fuel fabrication 
processes that will be discussed for AFCF will have elevated amounts of Am, Np, and 
Cm, which will complicate the non-destructive assay, and degrade the assay accuracy as 
seen in existing instruments.  This point will be discussed in more detail in Section-4 and 
6.c.   
 
Regarding the installed NDA equipment for J-MOX, additional equipment is also 
identified where needed – such as video cameras to confirm the ID number of the object, 
or independent load cells to confirm the gross weight of the container being assayed.  
Most of the systems noted in the table above will be installed for unattended operation, 
whereby the safeguards NDA data and/or surveillance imagery would be transmitted to 
the inspectors shift office at J-MOX for data archiving and evaluation.  It is expected that 
much of this data will be taken back to IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Austria for further 
evaluation – for estimating the “material unaccounted for” (MUF), the difference in 
Operator vs. Inspector estimates of MUF (MUF-D), and the running cumulative MUF 
(CUMUF). Even though in a modern TRU-fuel fabrication plant such as PFPF and J-
MOX, much of the safeguards equipment is permanently installed, it should also be 
remembered that many systems, such as some of the glove box assay systems, can be 
moved into position to survey those glove boxes that are randomly selected by the IAEA 
to verify the hold-up of MOX materials that cannot be easily containerized and assayed 
by dedicated systems. As noted above, it is envisioned that 100% of the process material 
transfers will be verified, provided that these materials are in a regular form or can be 
placed into standardized containers for assay, such as MOX powder feed canisters, MOX 
powder cans, MOX pellet boats, MOX rods (or fuel pins), and finished MOX assemblies. 
 
Although considerable progress has been made in the safeguarding TRU-fuel fabrication 
plants such as PFPF, it is important to remember that the TRU-fuel fabrication processes 
planned for AFCF will present some very different challenges that will be discussed later 
in this report in detail. 
 
Additionally, even though J-MOX is separate and apart from the Rokkasho Reprocessing 
Plant “RRP”, there were lessons learned during the start-up of RRP that may also be 
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relevant to the design and start-up of J-MOX, and by extension to other large modern 
TRU-fuel fabrication facilities.  The safeguards-relevant lessons from RRP are as 
follows: 23  24 
 
1. There is always a compromise between the number of safeguards verification 
samples desirable for inspection and the capacity for analysis even with the On-
Site Laboratory at RRP. The need for samples and required analysis must be 
considered carefully.  It is desirable to reduce the sample-taking burden and to use 
on-line non-destructive assay “NDA” to minimize the number of safeguards grab-
samples that must be taken. 
2. Designing automated evaluation software for safeguards systems is a very large 
job, especially when considering the integration of a number of complex 
safeguards related systems. Planning must begin early and considerable time must 
be budgeted for development, installation and testing of such systems. 
3. Because the RRP project was such a large and complex project taking place over 
ten years, it has been very difficult to maintain and keep organized all of the 
facility design information that will be relevant for performing future DIV 
activities. 
4. The IAEA Safeguards Department revised its policy on the joint-use of 
instruments for safeguards purposes. 25  One key point in this new policy is that all 
data used to verify the facility operator’s nuclear material declaration will not be 
shared with the operator or the national authorities until the declaration has been 
received by the IAEA.  This significantly limits the operator and will impact the 
ability to potentially use the operator’s instruments for safeguards purposes.  
More on this point will be discussed in connection with Safeguards Needs and 
Gaps, Section 7.0. 
5. The authentication of equipment used for safeguards and supplied by the facility 
operator or the national authorities needs to be considered during the design stage. 
The need to protect signals and data used for safeguards, including data 
encryption or the use of tamper-indicating conduit, also need to be considered at 
this stage. 
6. Modern distributed safeguards data collection systems require authentication and 
encryption architecture that must be controlled by the national safeguards 
authorities and the IAEA.  However, this can become problematic when the 
equipment, components and software may be assembled from a number of 
different sources.  Also, the national safeguards authorities and the IAEA will 
need to separately control the authentication and encryption architecture for their 
respective systems – this becomes problematic if the systems are shared. 
7. The IAEA safeguards approach used at RRP resulted in a “continuous inspection” 
regime, because of the number of safeguards and nuclear material verification 
activities – many of which involve safeguards sample taking and on-site sample 
analysis. This is not necessarily an efficient use of safeguards inspection 
resources.  As the number of large bulk-processing nuclear fuel cycle facilities 
under international safeguards increases, there will be an increased need for on-
line assay, remote data collection and more random use of on-site inspection 
activities – in lieu of continuous on-site inspector presence. 
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It must be remembered that all large prototype engineering projects require time to 
undergo “shakedown” and for the systems be de-bugged.  It took decades to refine the 
safeguards approach at Tokai, PFPF and the RRP.  It is likely that a similar effort will be 
required to optimize the approach at J-MOX, as well as new TRU fuel fabrication 
facilities planned for the U.S. 
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4. Safeguards Approach Options – Ceramic TRU (MOX) Fuel Fab 
Lines 
 
In reviewing the safeguards approaches for PFPF and for J-MOX, the safeguards 
approach options for new ceramic TRU (MOX) fuel fabrication plants have essentially 
been presented.  PFPF is the more established case, where the plutonium-bearing 
materials are inspected monthly in accordance with the IAEA’s requirement for the 
timely detection of possible diversions of “direct-use” material within thirty days of 
possible diversion.  The non-destructive assay equipment at PFPF has been tailored to the 
specific MOX containers or finished MOX products, based on techniques for determining 
plutonium content in purified nuclear materials at Los Alamos National Laboratory 
(LANL).  Redundant containment and surveillance has been added, especially at the feed 
storage vaults, and at the entry and exits to the other semi-automated pellet, MOX fuel 
rod, and finished assembly storage areas.  The other relevant details are as noted in 
Section-3. 
 
The conceptual safeguards approach for J-MOX is very similar in principle to that at 
PFPF, as noted in the simplified process flow diagram in Figure-2.  However, what is 
important to note in this slightly modified approach is the greater reliance on the 
collection of safeguard data through unattended assay and surveillance systems.  Also, 
there is a greater reliance on containment and surveillance measures to monitor MOX 
material storage areas in the middle of the fabrication process – namely the sintered 
pellet, scrap recovery and MOX fuel rod storage areas.  There is also a greater use of 
NDA systems (the advanced material accountancy glove box (AMGB) systems) built 
around the glove box transfer channels to survey virtually all movements of MOX-
bearing materials.  And finally, the central computerized data collection and evaluation 
(DC&E) system will have the capability to centrally collect all of the relevant safeguards 
assay and surveillance data for semi-automated review by the inspectors – although this 
has yet to be demonstrated. Together with the other safeguards measures at the IAEA’s 
disposal, such as the collection of environment samples and the measures under the 
Additional Protocol, this should make a very effective safeguards approach. 
 
Novel safeguards approach possibilities are presented in Section-8.  But in general, what 
is missing is a more efficient approach.  This could be potentially achieved through 
“process monitoring” by making greater use of the operator’s instruments for process 
control and prevention of nuclear criticality.  In principle, it is also possible to apply 
“predictive analytical modeling” in monitoring the process, to determine when certain 
safeguards thresholds might be crossed – well in advance of the monthly systematic 
material verification activities.  It is also possible to apply the concept of “statistical 
process control” to the safeguards verification activities, provided that the process can be 
well defined, as opposed to the systematic and mechanistic verification of MOX material 
transfers and inventories – as is currently done.  Broader use of “remote monitoring” is 
also possible to permit the national inspectorate and the IAEA, to monitor the safeguards 
of the facility from a distance – either a regional office within the country, or from IAEA 
headquarters in Vienna.  Of course, data security and encryption issues would need to be 
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addressed.  But remote monitoring would allow the inspectorates to collect the relevant 
safeguards data from a distance, and could dramatically reduce the use of inspectors to 
perform on-site activities – although it would not eliminate such activities altogether.  
And lastly, it is possible for a competent national or regional inspectorate to supplement 
the safeguards inspection effort in such facilities, as is done by Euratom in the European 
Union and by ABACC in Argentina and Brazil. In this case, the inspection activities 
could be divided between the national inspectorate, a regional inspectorate and the IAEA. 
This could dramatically reduce the IAEA’s inspection of such facilities.  Refer to 
Section-8 for a more detailed discussion of such ideas. 
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5. Safeguards Approach Options - Metallic Pyroprocessing Lines 
 
There are no pyro-processing facilities other than laboratories currently under 
international safeguards.  However, the U.S. AEC and later DOE, the (Japanese) Nuclear 
Fuel Cycle Institute (JNC) and CRIEPI in Japan, Toshiba Ltd., and the Korean Atomic 
Energy Research Institute (KAERI) have looked at pyro-metallurgical and pyro-
electrochemical processes to reprocess and re-fabricate nuclear fuel.   These concepts and 
the associated safeguards and proliferation analyses are documented in detail in the 
references noted. 26 27, 28,  This discussion has been previously presented in the first report 
on advanced safeguards approaches for new reprocessing facilities.  It is partly discussed 
here again, because of the intimate connection between the pyro-reprocessing and 
metallic TRU-fuel fabrication process.  The same issues presented previously regarding 
Cm-244 assay and the neutron-balance safeguards approach are relevant to the metallic 
TRU-fuel fabrication line as well. 
   
5.a Elements of a Safeguards Approach for Pyroprocessing 
 
Fundamentally, the safeguards approach applied to a small pyroprocessing facility will 
meet the safeguards objectives of an approach applied to a small aqueous reprocessing 
facility.  As in an aqueous reprocessing plant, the nuclear material in the spent fuel will 
be verified to the extent possible and the fuel will be stored in a spent fuel pond until it 
has cooled to allow the decay of gaseous fission products within the fuel.  The fuel to be 
reprocessed by the pyro process may be either metallic or oxide. The safeguards 
essentially follow the plutonium, although accounting of the uranium must also be done 
but to a lesser extent.  Also, there will likely be a higher fraction of other actinides in the 
fast reactor fuel, so accounting for neptunium, americium and curium will be relevant.   
 
Safeguards will focus on the spent fuel input, the plutonium and TRU-bearing materials 
in the process, and the plutonium and TRU-bearing output streams.  There are some 
important aspects related to safeguarding this prospective process: 
 
• There is not a lot of international experience with the pyro processes beyond 
laboratory or pilot-scale – that is part of the mission for AFCF. 
• High temperature salt and metal solutions are highly corrosive; such an 
environment will be a very challenging for safeguards equipment and instruments. 
• The small throughput of the AFCF pyroprocessing line (1 tonne per yr) should 
allow the safeguards approach to be optimized as the pyroprocessing technology 
is developed. 
• Assay of the nuclear materials in metal or salt solutions by DA or NDA will be 
very challenging, partly because there is not the same level of experience 
analyzing these materials as with the solutions from a PUREX-type reprocessing 
plant. 
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 5.b Pyro Processing Safeguards Approach Options: 
 
There are basically four prospective safeguards approaches for a pyro processing facility 
that could include a metallic TRU-fuel fabrication line:29 
 
Option 1: Neutron balance – Cm accounting, involves a total neutron measurement on 
each pin entering the system, the electro-refiner (molten-salt dissolver), the recast 
metallic fuel pins leaving the fuel fabrication process, and the waste streams. This 
approach would be enhanced with neutron-triggered video monitoring of the nuclear 
material transfer paths and access points. NDA or DA is conducted on the U/TRU 
product to determine Pu/Cm ratio, and process monitoring is used on the electro-refiner.30 
This concept maintains CofK for the Pu/Cm mixture, but does not measure plutonium 
directly, except perhaps retroactively from the U/TRU measurement at the end. In 
essence, the bulk of the neutrons measured are attributed to Cm-244, which can be 
measured by NDA.  If the ratio of Pu to Cm-244 is assumed to be fixed, then one can 
deduce the amount of plutonium present.  This method assumes that the Cm is never 
separated from the Pu, and that the U/TRU material is homogeneous.  One drawback of 
this option is that the approximately 30 kg hold-up of plutonium in the process would not 
be directly verifiable.  However, if the neutron balance is applied between the shear and 
product line, the holdup becomes a constant that cancels on both sides of the balance as a 
function of time.  Because the holdup is not accessible and can only be inferred, the 
facility design should minimize it to enhance proliferation resistance and safeguards. 
 
Option 2: Electro-refiner Assay, involves closing the material balance on the electro-
refiner each day, and does so through a complex set of assays on the Pu content of all U 
cathodes removed from the electro-refiner, all metal waste streams, the electro-refiner 
salt prior to daily removal (must be homogeneous), recharged salt returning to the 
electro-refiner, and the recovered salts from the metal waste and U product processing 
units. The weight of the electro-refiner salt removed daily is also needed.  The contents of 
the electro-refiner are assumed to be well mixed and homogeneous. The above 
information, along with DA sampling of the U/TRU product, allows the plutonium 
balance to be closed. This approach would involve a major batch or multi-batch tracking 
effort.  It relies on elaborate analyses that would certainly impact operations and cause 
delays between processing steps. It also assumes a constant Pu/Cm ratio, which could 
require process monitoring to confirm that this is the case.  The value determined for 
U/TRU product transferred out from this process is the nuclear material input for the 
metallic TRU-fuel fabrication line. 
 
Option 3: Homogenized Input, involves adding a homogenization step to the pyro-
process (e.g., oxidation/reduction and melting) after the element chopping step to produce 
a homogeneous molten salt solution for DA sample taking.  This sample is used to 
determine Pu composition and a Pu/Cm ratio for Pu accountability and downstream 
analysis steps. A Pu/Cm ratio (using total neutron data) can then be used until DA on the 
U/TRU product for Pu content can be obtained. Process monitoring could be used to 
ensure that the Pu/Cm ratio remains constant and integrated video & neutron monitoring 
would be used to monitor nuclear material entry and removal paths. This option is the 
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most disruptive and would require that the current conceptual design of the pyroprocess 
at AFCF be modified.  But it would provide for the most accurate nuclear material 
accountancy for plutonium and the other actinides. As in Option #2, the value determined 
for U/TRU product transferred out from this process is the nuclear material input for the 
metallic TRU-fuel fabrication line. 
 
Option 4: Assay of Pu in Spent Fuel via Pu/Cm ratio and DA, involves detailed total 
neutron axial profile measurements of each pin entering the pyro-process, and DA on a 
select number of rod pieces to determine the Pu/Cm ratio on a pin by pin basis. Total 
neutron measurements can then be used on the pyroprocess electro-refiner, metallic TRU 
fuel pin assembly line and waste streams. NDA or DA of U/TRU product would be used 
to confirm the Pu/Cm ratio and provide Pu assay for transfer to the next MBA. This ratio 
would also be used with electro-refiner neutron data to obtain the Pu inventory in the 
electro-refiner. Again, process monitoring and integrated video & neutron monitoring of 
material paths would be required. This is a modification of Option 1 to determine the 
plutonium content through detailed neutron profile assay and DA sampling of incoming 
pins. This technique would be the most straightforward option if there is a good 
measurement system for obtaining Pu content in the spent fuel. Without such a capability, 
the initial Pu assay must rely to some extent on calculations of the distribution of the 
Pu/Cm ratio within the pin. This could raise a question regarding validity of the 
verification. DA sampling of the spent fuel would have to be performed to prove that the 
assumptions are valid. As stated above, the value determined for U/TRU product 
transferred out from this process is the nuclear material input for the metallic TRU-fuel 
fabrication line. 
 
Each of the safeguards approach options as noted above has advantages and 
disadvantages, but in concept it appears feasible to use traditional nuclear material 
accountancy and other safeguards measures to safeguard at least a small pyroprocessing 
facility with a metallic TRU-fuel pin assembly line.  The determining factor will most 
likely be whether the DA and NDA analytical techniques and tools can be improved to 
the level of accuracy required.  The AFCF pyroprocessing line can ultimately help 
determine which of the aforementioned assumptions hold valid.  In fact, apart from 
developing the pyroprocessing technology, the benefits of using the pyroprocessing line 
at AFCF to test and develop different safeguards measures are obvious. 
 
5.c Metallic TRU-Fuel Fabrication Safeguards Measures: 
 
The safeguards measures envisioned for safeguarding a metallic TRU-fuel fabrication 
line, based on the example of a ceramic MOX-fuel fabrication facility, can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
1. Receipts of TRU-Fuel Feed Materials based on Shipper’s Values: Purified 
metallic uranium/TRU could be transferred from the pyro-processing line, based 
on “shipper-declared” values – the values for plutonium, uranium, and other 
actinides that the facility operator determined based on one of the assay options 
noted above. 
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2. Assay of TRU-Fuel Fabrication Feed Materials: the purified U/TRU ingot and 
other metallic TRU make-up materials could be assayed by a fuel fabrication feed 
assay station, possibly employing neutron counting and gamma spectroscopy.  
However, the presence of the other, “minor” actinides, such as curium, would 
complicate the non-destructive assay. 
3. Containment/Surveillance of TRU-Fuel Feed Materials: TRU-fuel feed 
materials would be stored in a secured vault or storage positions under video 
surveillance, which might also use of electronic seals that record seal status 
(open/or closed) and date and time of opening and closing. 
4. Assay of Fabricated TRU-Fuel Pins: using a non-destructive assay system 
potentially similar to the Fuel Pin Assay System “FPAS”, used for assaying 
MOX-fuel pins at the PFPF fuel fabrication facility in Japan. 
5. Assay of Fabricated TRU-Fuel Assemblies: using a non-destructive assay 
system potentially similar to the Fuel Assembly Assay System “FSAS”, used for 
assaying MOX assemblies at the PFPF fuel fabrication facility in Japan.  
6. Containment/Surveillance of TRU-Fuel Assemblies: finished TRU-assemblies 
would be stored in a secured vault or storage positions under video surveillance, 
which might also involve the use of electronic seals that record seal status 
(open/or closed) and date and time of opening and closing. 
7. Assay of TRU-Fuel Fabrication Waste Materials: using a non-destructive 
assay system potentially similar to the Plutonium Scrap Multiplicity Counter 
“PSMC” and Waste Drum Assay System “WDAS” used at PFPF in Japan.  
8. Assay of Hot-Cell or Glove Box Process Hold-up: using a non-destructive assay 
system potentially similar to the Super Glove-Box Assay System “SBAS” used at 
PFPF in Japan. 
9. In-situ Assay of Safeguards or Process Samples: using a non-destructive assay 
system potentially similar to the Inventory Sample Neutron Coincidence Counter 
“INVS” used at PFPF in Japan. 
10. Containment/Surveillance Covering Access to TRU-Fuel Hot Cells: in 
addition to monitoring the TRU-fuel feed storage and finished TRU-fuel assembly 
storage positions, the containment/surveillance system would also cover the 
access points to the TRU-fuel fabrication hot cells or glove boxes, perhaps using 
neutron-detectors or motion sensors as triggers.  This would enhance the 
effectiveness of the other safeguards measures.  
 
In the cases noted above, the non-destructive systems used to determine the content of 
plutonium, uranium and other actinides for nuclear material accounting and control 
purposes are likely to be based on total or coincident-neutron counting.  It is also likely 
that there would need to be a number of installed high-resolution gamma spectrometers 
“HRGS” to accurately determine the isotopic composition of plutonium and actinides in 
the TRU-bearing materials to support the neutron-counting based NDA systems. 
However, the determination of Pu-content by non-destructive assay would be 
complicated by the presence of the minor actinides, such as curium.  To prove such 
techniques are viable, additional research and development with comparable TRU-
bearing materials would need to be performed.  More will be said regarding this in 
Section-7, Safeguards Technology Needs and Gaps. 
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6. Safeguards Challenges 
 
6.a Ceramic TRU (MOX) Fuel Fabrication 
 
Regarding both the TRU-MOX and metallic (pyro) fuel fabrication processes planned for 
AFCF, one advantage favoring effective safeguards will be the relatively low throughput 
of approximately 1 MTHM fuel per year for each line.  Many semi-scale and industrial-
scale MOX fuel fabrication processes have been effectively operated, tested, and subject 
to international safeguards, including: Belgo-nucleaire (Mol, Belgium), Siemens MOX-I 
(formerly Alkem, Hanau, Germany), PPFF and PFPF (Tokaimura, Japan), as well as the 
new MOX Plant at Sellafield (UK) and MELOX (France) - the latter two being subject to 
European regional safeguards under the Euratom Inspectorate. 
 
The handling of transuranic elements in general, and plutonium in particular, must be 
done in fully enclosed glove boxes, which makes operation of the process and equipment 
more difficult.  Also relevant is the concern regarding nuclear criticality safety that will 
impose very strict limits on the design of the process equipment as well as the amount of 
TRU and Pu-bearing nuclear material that can be staged at the process steps.  
 
Since the TRU MOX may be effectively enriched in neptunium, americium, and curium, 
samples of such materials will need to be available (and in fact as soon as possible) so 
that the non-destructive assay equipment designers can optimize the design of the NDA 
equipment.  Ideally, the geometry of the TRU material containers and assay stations 
should be defined in the very near future to facilitate the design of these NDA systems, 
since the techniques tend to be geometry specific. The approaches presented in Sections-
3, 4 and 5 suggest the location of assay stations between process steps as proposed in the 
relevant figures (Fig. 2, 3, and 4).  However for the case of the conceptual TRU MOX 
and metallic TRU fuel fabrication lines proposed for AFCF, this still needs to be 
optimized and confirmed. 
 
Another challenge relevant to AFCF as a whole is that operating personnel and facility 
designers may be unfamiliar with IAEA international safeguards requirements in 
particular.  Of course, the actual construction of AFCF is many years in the future, but 
the IAEA experience with the construction and start-up of the Rokkashomura 
Reprocessing Plant (RRP) suggests that the sooner there is a dialogue between the facility 
designer/constructor/operator, U.S. DOE and the IAEA, the better.  This is especially so 
for the sake of verifying the facility design information, i.e. performing IAEA design 
information verification (DIV).  This topic is addressed in more detail in Section-7, but in 
principle the IAEA needs to be informed at the time that a decision is made to construct a 
nuclear facility – even one destined for completion many years into the future.  Using 
RRP as an example, DIV activities took place as early as 1996, during ground-breaking 
for the construction site, with the facility actually starting up and going hot circa 2006. 
 
Ultimately, one of the greatest challenges in trying to measure and optimize the design of 
NDA equipment for TRU and Pu-bearing materials is the iterative process of designing 
the equipment.  It is hoped that this process can be accelerated based on the experience 
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that some U.S. National Laboratories have with assaying Pu-bearing materials, but the 
measurement challenges that will arise because of the new TRU compositions cannot be 
over-estimated.  But at the end of it all, there is over 30 years of experience applying 
international safeguards to MOX fuel fabrication plants, from pilot-plant to industrial 
scale.  So, this problem can be solved.  
 
6.b Metallic (Pyroprocessing) TRU Fuel Fabrication  
 
Most of the challenges noted for ceramic TRU (MOX) fuel fabrication apply to metallic 
(pyro) fuel fabrication as well.  The paradox is that there is at least 40 years researching 
the process technology, at the former Argonne National Laboratory pyroprocessing 
facility adjacent to EBR-II, and so one would think that the technology would be well 
understood.  The problem is that the technology never reached industrial scale and so the 
process and attendant safeguards methods remained very much in a developmental state. 
Nonetheless, there is considerable research experience with the pyroprocess.  The work 
done by the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), in collaboration with the 
Idaho, Los Alamos, and Argonne National Laboratories, in designing the Advanced 
Spent Fuel Conditioning Pilot pyro-facility (ACP) in Daejeon, ROK has given insight 
into applying advanced safeguards methods at such a facility.31  Still, the metallic (pyro) 
TRU fuel fabrication process is experimental and it should be expected to operate 
intermittently, which will pose challenges for accounting and safeguarding the nuclear 
material in the process. 
 
Additionally, the product from the pyro separations process that will feed the metallic 
fuel fabrication process may not be fully decontaminated from fission products. In the 
past, enough fission products were removed so that the remaining nuclear material could 
be recycled, although heavy hot-cell concrete shielding was still required, due to the 
strong emission of gamma radiation from the material.  The positive note is that the 
material is harder to steal and handle due to the dangerous radiation levels. The 
safeguards challenge is that the non-destructive assay methods will now need to cope 
potentially with high gamma radiation, in addition to the veritable soup of transuranic 
elements being considered for the fuel. 
 
One must also not forget that the metallic pyro fuel fabrication process is afterall, a high 
temperature process, with attendant equipment failure and problems of accelerated 
corrosion that accompany such processes.  Again, INL, ANL and others have mastered 
many of the operational issues, but in general there is a lot less experience putting nuclear 
material detectors and safeguards equipment in such an environment.  Where the IAEA 
has place safeguards equipment in such high radiation and challenging environments, it 
has been a learning experience.  Although, the assay and surveillance objectives can 
eventually be met – in some cases by placing the NDA detectors and surveillance 
cameras outside of the hot-cell! 
 
The challenges as noted in the first report for the pyro fuel reprocessing process apply to 
the fuel fabrication process as well. In summary, these were: 
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• The design of such facilities and the characteristics of major process 
components are not well defined at this stage. So, the safeguards approach is 
only conceptual at this stage. 
• Characteristic metallic process solutions and processed materials are not 
available for assay at this time.   Until DA and NDA measurements can be 
made on materials of similar composition, volume, and configuration, the 
accuracy of such assay techniques cannot be determined. 
• Extensive DA analysis may be required to verify the stability of the Pu/Cm 
ratio and homogeneity of various materials. Safeguards can be substantially 
improved if the speed of such analysis can be increased, and cost decreased.  
• The distinct “combined batch” nature of the electro-refiner will lead to 
accountancy problems. As the uranium from each batch is separated out, the 
TRU content will build up in the electro-refiner until the concentration is high 
enough to allow the TRU-product to be removed.  This makes it impossible to 
assign specific TRU amounts to original receipts and input batches of spent 
nuclear fuel, except by using average or nominal values.  The implication is 
that the TRU/Pu/U ingot stored in the vault for feeding the metallic (pyro) 
TRU fuel fabrication process may not be well characterized or assayed. 
• Extensive integrated video surveillance/neutron monitoring may be required.  
This will generate huge data streams that must be analyzed efficiently by an 
automated review system. 
• Extensive process monitoring may be required, and such monitoring will need 
to be verifiable and authenticated.  
• Accurate methods for assaying the Pu content of spent fuel and TRU mixtures 
would greatly improve the ability of nuclear material accountancy and 
potentially NRTA to detect diversions. Timeliness and cost considerations, as 
well as the uncertainty in homogeneity of critical materials, favor the 
development of more accurate NDA measurement methods, if the error of 
these methods can be reduced from 5-10% to less than 1.0 %.  
 
6.c Varying Actinide Fuel Composition 
 
This has been noted, but mention is made here again to emphasize the particular 
challenge – both in terms of process fabrication and safeguards.  The TRU fuels that have 
been made in large scale have generally been made from plutonium and uranium mixed 
oxide, with plutonium content between 2 and 30% wt of the heavy metal.  Typically, the 
fuel has been fabricated from freshly, or near freshly separated plutonium.  Consequently 
the Am-241 content has been kept deliberately low to reduce the attendant gamma 
radiation that would make handling of the process materials and finished assemblies even 
more difficult.  This is also consistent with the “as low as reasonable achievable” 
(ALARA) principles in use to minimize unnecessary radiation exposure in the nuclear 
power industry and nuclear workplace. However, one of the purposes of AFCF will be to 
process and fabricate fuel with TRU-MOX and TRU-metal, having elevated contents of 
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neptunium, americium, and curium.  Based on historical processing experience with these 
other actinides, the process and material containments can be enhanced or designed to 
accommodate the alpha containment hazard and the stronger gamma and neutron 
emissions during fabrication.  The two greater foreseeable challenges will be: 1) handling 
the TRU materials in a finished state, such as a finished TRU-MOX assembly “enriched” 
in americium, and 2) the design of non-destructive assay (NDA) techniques that will still 
be able to determine the plutonium and other actinide content of such materials in a 
higher coincident-neutron flux (due to Cm-244) or gamma radiation field (due to Am-
241). Yes, it is believed that such technical problems can be solved, but only after 
adequate samples of the future TRU materials have been prepared so that the NDA 
techniques can be demonstrated and tested on such materials. 
 
 
6.d Distributed vs. Collocated Facilities 
 
Most nuclear fuel cycle facilities have historically been distributed.  That is, the fuel 
fabrication, nuclear power reactor and nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities have been 
located at different sites.  Although this was not always the case, it was generally the 
case. The main reason was that there was no apparent advantage for such facilities to be 
collocated on the same site.  The economic advantage was derived from scaling up the 
capacity of the facilities to derive a “greater economy of scale”.  So, nuclear power plants 
were grouped in modular clusters of 2 to 6 units (or 10, if one were to combine the 
Fukushima Dai-Ichi and Dai-Ni reactor groups in Japan), and fuel fabrication and 
reprocessing plants were doubled or tripled in capacity with the addition of other units.  
However, it must be remembered that the Integrated Fuel Cycle facility complex at the 
Idaho National Laboratory (formerly Argonne-West), which includes EBR-II and the 
collocated pyro fuel reprocessing and metallic fuel fabrication line demonstrated this 
concept of “collocation” 40 years ago.  The idea was that the fuel from a fast reactor 
could be pyro-processed in a suite of hot-cells adjacent to the reactor building to remove 
the neutron-poisoning fission products, and that this plutonium-bearing metal could be 
recast into new fuel rods in the hot-cell for reloading the fast reactor.  The idea was and 
remains simple, elegant and ingenious.  The fast reactor produced additional nuclear fuel 
during operation, the neutron-poisoning fission products that accumulated were removed 
by the pyro-processing, and the partly decontaminated fuel material was recycled – 
without regular receipts or shipments of plutonium or high-enriched uranium (HEU) 
fresh or spent fuel.  Under the transmutation fuel cycle scheme being considered, the fast 
reactor may be an “actinide burner” rather than a “breeder”, but the benefits of 
collocating fuel cycle facilities are the same – collocation reduces the risk of special 
fissionable material being intercepted and diverted either during shipment to, or from the 
nuclear power plant.  Certainly, safeguarding collocated facilities is a degree simpler, 
because it is easier to monitor for the “borrowing” of nuclear material between facilities 
at the time of taking the physical inventory.  This is more challenging if the nuclear 
facilities that ship and receive similar nuclear materials are distributed over the country.  
Nonetheless, safeguarding distributed nuclear facilities is a challenge that the IAEA and 
U.S. DOE have addressed for over thirty years.  In the end, it would seem that the 
decision regarding the collocation of nuclear facilities will be dictated based on the 
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maturity of the facility design and the relative economics of distributed vs. collocated 
facilities.  As a final word on this issue, it is worth noting that Toshiba Ltd. in Japan 
fairly recently prepared designs and an engineering model of next generation fast 
reactors, collocated with pyro-reprocessing and fuel fabrication facilities and port 
facilities.32 
 
6.e Alternative Nuclear Materials (ANM) 
 
Because Np-237 and Am-241 fission, they are considered alternative nuclear materials.  
However, this also implies that they should be safeguarded as special nuclear materials.  
This decision has in fact been made by U.S. DOE, and materials bearing these elements 
are safeguarded under U.S. DOE regulations.33  However, the IAEA position on this is 
less clear.  In essence, what has taken place is that concerned IAEA Member States 
brought this issue before the IAEA Board of Governors circa 1997, and the Board 
resolved for the IAEA Safeguards Department to send letters to the Member States 
asking them if they had or were planning to separate americium and neptunium, and what 
the holdings were of such separated materials in the country.  The IAEA also requested 
that the Member States annually issue updated declarations regarding the separation, use 
and inventories of americium and neptunium.  The problem is that few States replied, 
agreeing to provide this information.34  So, the issue is that americium and neptunium are 
not defined by the IAEA as safeguardable “nuclear material”, although the IAEA has 
requested Member States to provide information regarding this material voluntarily.  
Presently, this is not a great concern for the IAEA, since very few states possess or 
actively demonstrate fuel reprocessing technology – the only viable route to separating 
americium and neptunium in significant quantities.  However, if there were more wide-
spread separation and concentration of americium and neptunium, as is envisioned under 
the advanced nuclear fuel cycle programs being considered, then the safeguards and 
reporting requirements for these materials should be harmonized between U.S. DOE, the 
international community, and the IAEA. It is recommended that the U.S. DOE or NNSA 
revisit this outstanding issue with the IAEA Safeguards Department, in light of the U.S. 
DOE proposal to more widely use and separate americium and neptunium.  
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7. Safeguards Technology Needs and Gaps 
 
From the preceding discussion in the report, the following section reviews the most 
apparent technology gaps and identifies needs for safeguarding the new TRU fuel 
fabrication processes planned for AFCF. 
 
There is a need to develop new methods to accurately measure the plutonium (Pu) and 
actinide content (uranium, neptunium, and americium) in the TRU-MOX and TRU-
process and finished materials by non-destructive assay (NDA).  This would include 
TRU-MOX powder, pellets, rods and finished assemblies, as well as metallic TRU feed 
ingots, cast pins, rods, and finished assemblies.  Based on the advanced safeguards 
approach applied at PFPF and planned for J-MOX in Japan, it is expected that these 
materials will need to be assayed as transferred between processing steps and at storage 
locations, to verify nuclear material transfers and inventory stock taking. The expected 
assay locations are as noted in Figures-3 and 4 of the preceding report.  The desired 
accuracy for such NDA is approximately +/- 2 to 8% total Pu and other actinides, based 
on the performance of existing NDA systems used at PFPF, although the accuracy for 
assaying the TRU-bearing waste and for assessing the hold-up of TRU materials not in 
containers is not to this level of performance.35  Consequently, there is a significant need 
to improve the accuracy of these NDA methods – for mixed TRU waste and TRU glove 
box hold-up. 
 
Non-destructive assay methods based on coincident-neutron counting are geometry 
specific, therefore there is a need to fix the locations of anticipated NDA systems planned 
and optimize the design of the detectors and related equipment.  The numerous NDA 
systems built for PFPF and planned for J-MOX are based on over 30 years of experience 
with such facility and process-specific systems in Japan and at specific U.S. National 
Laboratories.  Even though AFCF will be an experimental facility to develop nuclear fuel 
cycle technologies and processes, it would be best not to “beta-test” equipment intended 
for nuclear material safeguards.  For this reason, there is a need to design, develop and 
test the anticipated NDA equipment in advance of deployment at AFCF – to permit 
demonstration of the method and “proof of principle” of the new NDA equipment, i.e. to 
make certain that it will work as planned.  It would also be best, if the actual assay 
location (glove box, sample assay station, pellet tray storage location, fuel rod storage 
location, and fuel assemblies) could be “mocked-up” to the exact geometry and 
dimensions to the extent practical. 
 
In addition to replicating the geometry of the conceptual assay containers and stations is 
the need to prepare sample materials having the composition of the TRU materials that 
are planned for the future.  Fast reactor TRU MOX assemblies have been prepared with 
as much as 30% wt. Pu, but as noted before there is not a lot of experience preparing 
TRU MOX with elevated neptunium, americium, and curium content – let alone target 
assemblies that might be made largely of americium and curium-MOX. For this reason 
there is a need to prepare at least small quantities of these materials so that their gamma 
and neutron radiation can be more completely characterized, for the sake of performing 
future non-destructive assay.  There is an urgent need to do this, even if this must be done 
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in collaboration with other international laboratories that have been more actively 
engaged with actinide research over the last thirty years, such as in France, Russia, Japan 
and the United Kingdom.  It must be recognized that the proposed assay methods cannot 
be refined, especially the NDA methods, until samples of representative MOX materials 
are available and the geometry of the measurement situation can be replicated as noted 
above.  These are the prerequisite steps to defining the most effective assay methods for 
the future TRU materials to be handled in the fuel fabrication processes being discussed. 
 
Although the safeguards measures employed and referred to at PFPF are effective, they 
are not as efficient as they could be since many of the NDA and review systems are 
operated in attended or only partly-unattended mode.  That is, an inspector comes to the 
facility and randomly selects materials or a glove box to be assayed and positions the 
equipment to assay the material, or the instrument collects the data, but the inspector 
must come monthly to download the data and review it at another location – perhaps an 
office at the facility.  This inefficiency is partly addressed in the conceptual design of the 
unattended NDA and surveillance instruments planned for the conceptual J-MOX 
facility. However, the large-scale data authentication, data collection and integration into 
a centralized safeguards data collection and evaluation system has yet to be 
demonstrated.  In facilitating this, it helps that many of the coincident neutron counting, 
and gamma spectroscopy NDA instruments and surveillance instruments have been 
developed by a limited number of suppliers (such as Los Alamos National Laboratory, 
Canberra/Aquila Instruments, and Dr Neumann Electronik GmbH).  Consequently, it has 
been at least been possible to perform review of the NDA data on a common radiation 
review platform.  Similarly, it has been possible to perform semi-automated video 
surveillance review using a common review software to detect video scenes with changes 
and missing scenes, as well as correlated radiation spikes, events or “triggers”.  However, 
new methods of performing NDA may be developed by other laboratories and suppliers 
outside of the group that has supported such development of safeguards equipment in the 
past.  Consequently, there will be a need for a standard software architecture and 
equipment platform for integrating the safeguards data.  This leads to the over-arching 
need to develop and demonstrate a centralized safeguards data collection and evaluation 
system.  It cannot be emphasized enough that even with the successful safeguarding of a 
complex and large TRU MOX fuel fabrication plant such as PFPF, this has yet to be 
demonstrated.  This has been tried recently with the start-up at the Rokkashomura 
Reprocessing Plant (RRP), using the centralized Integrated Inspection Information 
System “I3S”.  However, this centralized and computerized data collection and 
evaluation continues to be refined.  Nonetheless, it does tend to remind all of the 
challenges of collecting, integrating, and evaluating large amounts of disparate 
safeguards data that the inspector must make sense of, quickly. 
 
Still it must be recognized that the national and international safeguards inspection 
authorities cannot use the traditional means of individually chasing down process 
materials for grab sampling and assay in large and modern fuel cycle facilities.  The only 
way that safeguards can be implemented efficiently will be with distributed on-line assay 
stations, centralized data collection and evaluation, and with remote transmission of the 
data to a regional office or the inspectorate headquarters.  Of course, in transmitting the 
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data remotely, there is a need to authenticate and perhaps encrypt the data to prevent 
interception by third parties.  It would also need to be determined who will receive the 
data.  In Japan, the IAEA has demonstrated remote monitoring of surveillance and 
electronic seals in nuclear power plants (NPPs), as well as selected NDA and surveillance 
stations at PFPF. In some cases, the data may be encrypted and forwarded to IAEA 
headquarters in Vienna, and in other cases, the data is transmitted only to the IAEA 
Tokyo Regional Office to be evaluated by resident IAEA inspectors.  Such a system 
could be deployed in the U.S. as well over the fuel reprocessing and TRU fuel fabrication 
facilities in AFCF, either for U.S. DOE or for the IAEA, or for both.  The point is that 
there will be a need for most of the safeguards data to be remotely transmitted so that 
inspectors do not need to reside continuously at the facility during operation – although 
this is more an issue for the reprocessing lines than the fuel fabrication lines.  There is 
also the need to define the protocols for transmitting and encrypting the data – what data, 
how will it be encrypted, where will it be sent, who will receive it, and what measures 
will be in place to prevent misuse of such data. 
 
Mention had been made in the first report in this series regarding the desire to share 
instruments with the facility operator and/or national inspectorate, for the sake of 
reducing the cost of the inspection effort. As was noted in Table-2 of this report, some of 
the NDA and surveillance systems planned for J-MOX will actually be purchased and 
provided by the plant operator (JNFL) and the national safeguards inspectorate 
(JSGO/NMCC).  However, there is currently an IAEA Safeguards Department policy, 
SGTS#20 that is fairly restrictive regarding the prospect sharing of equipment that 
provides safeguards data between the IAEA and another party.  This has caused 
significant issues between the plant operator, national inspectorate and IAEA during the 
start-up of RRP.  Consequently, there is a need to involve the IAEA at an early stage to 
determine what data is ultimately required for safeguarding the TRU fuel fabrication lines 
and to determine who will provide what equipment, and to determine what data or 
equipment can be shared.  It is also quite possible that the subject IAEA SG/SGTS Policy 
#20 could be more flexibly interpreted – provided that the IAEA would still be able to 
gather enough safeguards data to derive independent safeguards conclusions regarding 
the facility. 
 
Equipment that will be offered to the IAEA for safeguards use must meet the IAEA’s 
authentication requirements.  These requirements have become more stringent in the 
recent past; so many equipment designers are not familiar with designing to these new 
standards.  Also, future safeguards equipment should be designed to be more easily 
inspected for authentication purposes. The IAEA’s equipment authentication procedures 
sometimes result in the expensive replacement of equipment.  The ability to remotely 
ascertain the state of health (SoH) of safeguards equipment and to perform remote 
maintenance on the equipment could greatly reduce the cost of operating the equipment 
while enhancing its reliability.  Unfortunately, doing this without compromising the 
security of the equipment is extremely difficult and requires additional development. 
 
Enhanced tools for verifying facility design information for nuclear facilities is necessary 
throughout the lifecycle of the facilities. The 3-Dimensional Laser Range Finder Detector 
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(3DLRF) was developed by JRC/Ispra and used extensively at RRP to verify the 
construction and installation of the main process cells, vessels, and piping of safeguards 
significance.36 However, these tools may need other features such as gamma detection to 
permit the inspectors to verify the configuration of equipment and vessels in hot-cells that 
will no longer be accessible due to high levels or radiation or contamination.37  In 
addition, there is a need to define a protocol for collecting and storing the design 
information verification (DIV) data.  Such a protocol was established with JSGO in Japan 
with the detailed computerized topographic data collected by the 3DLRF.  However, this 
was a very limited and unique case.  Such a protocol would need to be established 
between U.S. DOE and the IAEA regarding the collection and storage of DIV data from 
AFCF as well.  It is also important to recall that facility design information must be 
provided to the IAEA by the national authorities, once a decision is made by the country 
to build new fuel cycle facilities.  Therefore, there is a need to provide even conceptual 
design information regarding AFCF to the IAEA, once U.S. DOE and the U.S. 
Government have made the decision to construct AFCF. 
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8. Novel Safeguards Approaches – Possibilities 
 
In principle, the 1 THM/yr TRU fuel fabrication lines at AFCF do not appear to present 
an insurmountable challenge for the application of an international safeguards approach.  
The greater safeguards challenge may be coping with the flexible nature of the facility, 
and the idea of potentially applying international safeguards and/or methods in a 
sophisticated fuel cycle facility in a nuclear weapons state, like the United States.  On top 
of this will be the challenge of perhaps performing design information verification and 
other inspection activities over the construction and operating life of the facility in a 
situation where the facility may be made available on the Eligible Facility List (EFL), 
and selected for verification one year, but perhaps not the following years.  The IAEA 
could also perhaps select only one MBA for inspection, such as the ceramic TRU MOX 
process area, or the metallic TRU fuel fabrication process area to test new procedures, 
methods, and equipment.   The reader should bear in mind that the spent fuel ponds and 
plutonium product storage vaults at the British Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant 
(THORP) and the their counterparts at the French UP-3 Reprocessing Plant are 
safeguarded by the IAEA – in two nuclear weapons states.  So, such a precedent does 
exist.  The fact remains that it should be straight forward to apply an international 
safeguards approach to two small TRU fuel fabrication line such as at AFCF.   
 
However, there are significant challenges in trying to safeguard an experimental TRU 
fuel fabrication line as noted in Sections-6 and 7.  Although, the advanced safeguards 
approaches used at PFPF and planned for J-MOX in Japan have been duly considered, 
these approaches are best suited for semi-industrial and industrial-scale TRU-fuel 
fabrication plants, having a dedicated and fixed product line.  The approaches that have 
been used at PFPF and planned for J-MOX will work, since they rigorously meet the 
IAEA’s detection and timeliness goals – but there are other ideas to consider, which 
would be less mechanistic and potentially more efficient in using safeguards inspection 
resources.  Many of these novel safeguards approaches have been discussed in the first 
report regarding the safeguarding of the new nuclear fuel reprocessing lines that are 
planned, but they are summarized here again tailored to safeguarding an experimental 
TRU fuel fabrication facility.  
 
Process Monitoring  
In the context of safeguarding a reprocessing plant, process monitoring refers to the use 
of the operator’s instruments over the entire process to provide additional assurance that 
the chemical separations process is (or is not) being operated as declared.  The same idea 
is relevant to the monitoring of a TRU fuel fabrication line, especially an experimental 
line.  Already, at PFPF and planned for J-MOX, the facility owner/operator will have 
additional assay instruments that the inspectors use, or will use, to supplement their 
safeguards knowledge of nuclear materials in the process.  Of course, as had been 
mentioned under Section-7, there would have to be close coordination with the IAEA, 
especially regarding the Safeguard’s Department/SGTS Policy #20, regarding the joint 
use of equipment for safeguards purposes.  However, there are large numbers of 
instruments that the plant operator uses for process control and for preventing nuclear 
criticality that could be used additionally for safeguards purposes.  The challenges 
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ultimately become: determining what instruments can be shared, determining what data 
can be shared and how it can be shared, and finally integrating this data into the 
centralized safeguards data control and evaluation computer.  Additionally, this data 
could be potentially reviewed by a predictive analytical model to confirm that the 
operator’s process is being operated as declared.  With this knowledge, it could be argued 
that the current nuclear material verification requirements, as defined by the IAEA 
Safeguards Criteria for “Direct-Use fuel Fabrication Plants” be relaxed.38  This could lead 
to a substantial reduction in the number of TRU material containers that must currently 
be analyzed or sampled. 
 
Enhanced Physical Barrier Containment 
The idea in this case is that there are certain situations, such as process hot-cells, where 
the construction of the facility severally restricts and controls the movement of nuclear 
material and personnel access to the material.  In this case, the doors and hatches 
accessing the hot cells are restricted and could be tightly monitored.  Currently, the IAEA 
safeguards criteria does not really consider the physical barrier as affecting the 
safeguarding of the material.  As a consequence, the verification requirements remain the 
same if the material contains plutonium, regardless of whether the material is fairly 
inaccessible in a monitored hot-cell or directly accessible in a product-handling glove 
box. However, the nuclear material verification requirements could be potentially 
reduced, if one could verify that the material has not been removed from the hot-cell.  
The example of the hot-cell is very relevant, since the metallic (pyro) TRU fuel 
fabrication line will be constructed within hot-cells, as previously with the Integrated 
Fuel Cycle Facility adjacent to EBR-II in at the Idaho National Laboratory.  In this case, 
if the nuclear material feed and removal pathways are well-defined and monitored, then 
the entire hot cell enclosure, or modules, could constitute a form of 
“containment/surveillance”.  That is, the TRU material in the process could be considered 
effectively under seal, or camera surveillance, or both. There would still be the issue of 
timely random material verification to confirm that the inventory or hold-up in the 
process has not been diverted, but potentially, the material verification requirements 
could be reduced, if one gives credit for the physical barrier containment of the hot-cell. 
 
Randomized Verification Approach  
The IAEA Safeguards Criteria defines the frequency of verification, and required level of 
detection probability, for the verification of plutonium and uranium, based on the type of 
nuclear facility, whether the material is “direct use”, “non-direct use”, irradiated, the type 
of inventory, or inventory change, etc.39  However, if the safeguards approach were to use 
highly complementary safeguards measures, and if the facility operator could provide 
declarations of activities in advance, it is conceivable that the inspectors could randomly 
select activities, rather than verify all activities.  An example might be the random 
verification of plutonium or TRU material transfers.  We see this as being the safeguards 
equivalent of applying the principles of “Statistical Process Control”, rather than 
sampling and testing 100% of all items (or transfers) of interest.  For this measure to be 
effective, the state would have to have acceptable “non-proliferation” credentials, the 
facility operator would have to have a history of being cooperative, the operator would 
have to be able to declare activities in advance, and the additional measures would have 
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to be capable of recording the activities that were not verified by the inspector.  Such a 
methodology could perhaps be tested at AFCF, since it is already conceived as a nuclear 
fuel cycle technology test bed. 
 
Supplementing Inspection Effort with National or Regional Inspectorates 
To more efficiently use IAEA inspection resources there are cases where the IAEA has 
taken verification credit for safeguards verification activities performed by multi-national 
regional inspection agencies, such as Euratom and ABACC.40  Of course, this has 
depended on the type of inspection activity, and the IAEA has always insisted on the 
right to independently verify the activity.  Another evolution of this idea could involve 
multi-national (regional) verification at a site level, for especially sensitive facilities, such 
as reprocessing and TRU fuel fabrication plants. There is already discussion of 
“International Fuel Cycle Centers” being subjected to international safeguards. 41  
However, what exactly this means and what it would entail is still being discussed.  
Along the same idea, a regional inspection agency could also inspect the “international” 
or “regional” fuel cycle facility, provided that they do this in support of the IAEA, and 
that the IAEA still has the right to perform independent verifications.  In the case of 
reprocessing and TRU fuel fabrication lines at AFCF, this might mean that U.S. DOE or 
NRC safeguard inspectors could perform safeguards inspections in alternating fashion 
with the IAEA, to supplement the IAEA’s safeguarding of these facilities.  This would 
also promote the transfer of what is learned safeguarding the advanced processes at 
AFCF to the IAEA – if the DOE and NRC inspectors function in tandem or alternate with 
IAEA inspectors. 
  
In summary, some novel safeguards concepts have been presented that go well beyond 
traditional safeguards measures and approaches.  It is recommended that they be 
discussed in an international forum, and in the most promising cases, that they be tested 
at the Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycle Demonstration Facilities to determine if they do 
improve the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards. 
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9. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
This study concludes that an effective safeguards approach for the new ceramic TRU-
MOX and metallic TRU-fuel fabrication lines planned for AFCF could be based on 
advanced safeguards measures, as have been applied to PFPF, and as have been planned 
for J-MOX in Japan. In principle, it should be easier to safeguard these lines, because of 
the relatively low throughput of 1 THM TRU fuel per year per line, compared to the 
industrial-scale capacity of PFPF and J-MOX (apx. 40 THM and 100 THM, 
respectively).  However, there will be significant challenges in safeguarding both TRU 
fuel fabrication lines, because of the experimental and flexibility nature of AFCF, as well 
as the complexity of the conceptual fuel fabrication processes (as currently designed).  To 
address these safeguards challenges, additional developments in safeguards technology 
and methods are recommended as noted in the “needs” identified below.  It should also 
be noted that there is not as much operating experience with the metallic (pyro) fuel 
fabrication process as with the ceramic TRU-MOX fuel fabrication process.  
Consequently, there will be a much greater need to optimize this process than the ceramic 
process.  The operability of the metallic TRU fuel fabrication process will ultimately 
affect the safeguardability of the process, although it is clear that the point of AFCF is to 
develop and test new nuclear fuel reprocessing and fuel fabrication processes and 
technology.  Regarding the safeguarding of both fuel fabrication processes, a close and 
early dialogue with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna is 
recommended to ensure the viability of some of the more novel and advanced safeguards 
measures as discussed in this report.  And finally, it must be reiterated that the assay of 
purified MOX and Pu-bearing materials to date has been simplified by the relative 
absence of other actinides.  The principle method of determining the mass of Pu has been 
coincident neutron counting combined with high resolution gamma spectroscopy, which 
is challenged when other actinides such as neptunium, americium and curium are present 
in more significant concentration.  So, even though TRU MOX fuel fabrication facilities 
have been effectively safeguarded in the past, the assay methods needed for the future 
facilities will need to be further developed and optimized for the new TRU 
(“transmutation”) fuel that is planned. 
 
From the preceding discussion, the following “needs” are identified in order to 
effectively and efficiently safeguard the new TRU fuel fabrication processes planned for 
AFCF: 
 
• Develop non-destructive assay (NDA) methods to accurately measure the 
plutonium (Pu) and actinide content in TRU fuel fabrication process materials and 
finished TRU fuel assemblies.  (This is currently complicated by the presence of 
other “minor actinides”.  This method should be capable of detecting “partial 
defects in accordance with current IAEA criteria, i.e. accuracy approximately +/- 
5% total Pu and other actinides.)  To demonstrate these methods, samples of the 
TRU materials planned for the future facilities will have to be prepared for testing 
purposes. 
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• Many of these NDA methods or systems will need to be designed “in-line” to 
measure the materials in the process and during transfer from one fabrication step 
to the next, to facilitate the timely verification of nuclear material transfers and the 
taking of process inventory.  These methods should be amenable to remote data 
transmission to permit “remote monitoring” of the facility for more efficient 
safeguards.  Many of the NDA techniques are dependent on the geometry of the 
container or assay station.  So, once the assay techniques are selected, the assay 
stations or TRU objects to be assayed will need to be “mocked-up” to prove the 
techniques. 
 
• Make greater use of automated, unattended/remote monitoring systems for 
collecting safeguards data, while cooperating with the facility owner/operator and 
national authorities to ensure protection of proprietary information. Develop a 
more completely automated and integrated safeguards data collect and review 
system for analyzing process and on-line assay data and surveillance imagery to 
support verification of the nuclear material transfers, inventory, and operational 
status of the facility. 
 
• Establish an active dialogue with the IAEA to negotiate a more flexible 
interpretation of the IAEA Department of Safeguards SGTS Policy #20, 
concerning the joint use of equipment for safeguards purposes.  The current 
interpretation is very restrictive and limits the ability of the IAEA to use a broad 
range of existing plant instruments because of the supposed need to derive 
independent safeguards conclusions from these instruments.  It is proposed that 
this strict interpretation should be applied only to those instruments of primary 
safeguards importance – and not to the extensive array of plant instruments, which 
could still provide complementary data of safeguards relevance regarding 
operation of the facility. 
 
• Cooperate with the facility owner/operator and national authorities to try to design 
safeguards requirements and equipment into the conceptual design at the earliest 
stages of the conceptual design of the facility. 
 
• Make the inspection regime more efficient by using randomized short-notice 
inspections, applying a “statistical process control” approach to verification of the 
reprocessing facilities rather than a scheduled systematic verification of all major 
transfers of plutonium-bearing materials.  For this kind of approach to be effective 
the facility operator would need to declare the major activities involving nuclear 
material in advance. It would also be more efficient and effective to apply this 
approach on a site, rather than facility level. 
 
• Discuss the proposed novel safeguards approaches in an international forum, and 
in the most promising cases, test them to determine if they would improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of safeguarding a modern TRU-fuel fabrication 
facility. 
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• The conceptual process schematics for both the TRU-MOX and metallic (pyro) 
fuel fabrication processes planned for AFCF are very complex, incorporating a 
number of additional acid dissolution, solvent extraction and denitration process 
steps – many of which are not normally seen in modern TRU-MOX fabrication 
plants. Consequently, there is a need to review these conceptual processes to see if 
they can be simplified – for the sake of stable process operations as well as to 
facilitate nuclear material safeguards. 
 
• The conceptual process schematics for the processes noted above also do not 
indicate dedicated storage areas for Pu and TRU-bearing process materials such as 
feed material in process, sintered pellets, fabricated fuel rods, or finished 
assemblies.  There is a need to review the current conceptual designs to see that 
such secure storage areas are designed into the process to facilitate stable process 
operation and to provide nuclear material inventory points that will facilitate 
nuclear material inventory stock taking. 
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APPENDIX – A 
Glossary and List of Abbreviations ♦ 
 
3DLRF (also known as 3DLRFD and LIDAR) - The 3-Dimensional Laser Range 
Finder Detector, developed by the European Joint Research Center at Ispra.  The device 
is used by the IAEA to verify the nuclear facility design and construction during a 
“Design Information Verification activity “DIV”. The device uses an infrared laser 
reflectometer and a high speed laptop computer to compile 3-dimensional topographical 
images of process vessels and cells surveyed.  This imagery can be used by the IAEA 
later and compared to future scans to see if changes have been made to the cell or vessel 
of interest. 
 
93+2 -  The “93+2” Campaign to strengthen safeguards at the IAEA, launched after the 
revelation of the clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iraq, circa 1991. It was 
launched in 1993 was expected to take 2 years to define and implement a roadmap for 
strengthening IAEA safeguards.  Several additional safeguards measure and new 
requirements came out of the program, which ultimately included those provisions and 
measures in the IAEA Additional Protocol. 
 
AAS- Advanced Accountancy System; a centralized nuclear material accountancy 
(accountability) system used by the facility operator of the Plutonium Fuel Production 
Facility “PFPF” in Tokaimura, Japan.  
 
AAVS- Advanced Accountancy Verification System; a centralized nuclear material 
accounting verification system used by the facility operator of the Plutonium Fuel 
Production Facility “PFPF” in Tokaimura, Japan. 
 
ABACC- Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material; 
the regional safeguards inspectorate in South America, which includes inspectors from 
Argentina and Brazil who perform joint-inspections in the two member countries in the 
same manner as Euratom in Western Europe.  
 
ABR - Advanced Burner Reactor; a conceptual future fast reactor design considered 
under GNEP for actinide transmutation and commercial electrical power generation. 
 
AC/S –Advanced Containment and Surveillance System; an advanced integrated system 
used by the facility operator of the Plutonium Fuel Production Facility “PFPF” in 
Tokaimura, Japan.  The system combines a number of different sensors, gamma 
detectors, crane monitors, and surveillance cameras.  The data from the system is 
reviewed on a high-speed digital image processing system to detect changes in the area 
under surveillance.  The IAEA has use of some of the components of the AC/S. 
 
                                                
♦ The definitions of acronyms and abbreviations are based on the references in the Reference Section of 
this report. 
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ACP (also known as ACPF) – Advanced Spent Fuel Conditioning Process or Facility; a 
process developed by the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute “KAERI” in 
Daejeon, S. Korea to treat spent fuel from light water reactors using pyrometallurgical 
and electrochemical methods.  The product from the process would be a metal ingot 
consisting largely of uranium with approximately 1% plutonium and some fission 
product contaminants.  It is similar to the first-cycle of a pyro-reprocessing process.  
Start-up of the process is still pending (as of 2007).  
 
AFAS- Advanced Fuel Assembly Assay System; an unattended non-destructive assay 
system planned for the J-MOX facility being built in Rokkashomura, Japan to assay fresh 
MOX-fuel assemblies.  The system will consist of coincident-neutron detector/analyzers 
and a surveillance camera for noting the fuel assembly identification number. 
 
AFCF - Advanced Fuel Conditioning Facility; a conceptual research facility planned by 
the U.S. Department of Energy for the research and development of advanced nuclear 
fuel cycle technology.  The facility is expected to conduct research over a period of 50 
years in the area of proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel reprocessing and TRU-fuel 
fabrication. 
 
AFPA- Advanced Fuel Pin Assay system; an unattended non-destructive assay system 
planned for the J-MOX facility being built in Rokkashomura, Japan to assay fresh MOX-
fuel pins or rods.  The system will consist of unattended coincident-neutron 
detector/analyzers, a gamma spectrometer, and a surveillance camera for noting fuel pin 
movements. 
 
AFPM- Advanced Fuel Pin Magazine assay system; an unattended non-destructive assay 
system planned for the J-MOX facility being built in Rokkashomura, Japan to assay fresh 
MOX-fuel pin magazines.  The system will consist of unattended coincident-neutron 
detector/analyzers and a surveillance camera for noting fuel pin magazine movements. 
 
AISV- Advanced Inventory Sample Verification system; an attended non-destructive 
assay system planned by the Japanese national safeguards inspectorate (JSGO) and the 
IAEA to verify samples of MOX materials at the J-MOX facility in Rokkashomura, 
Japan.  The system will use a well-shaped coincident-neutron detector/analyzer and a 
high resolution gamma spectrometer. 
 
ALARA- “As Low as Reasonably Achievable”; a doctrine of radiation exposure control 
to limit the exposure of personnel in a nuclear facility to the lowest level of radiation dose 
possible. In keeping with this work practice, additional radiation shielding may be added 
to parts of the facility emitting higher levels of radiation and work practices and 
procedures will be reviewed to minimize work time and exposure to personnel in 
radiation zones. 
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AMGB- Advanced Material Accountancy Glove Box assay system; an unattended non-
destructive assay system planned by the IAEA to assay cans of MOX materials in the 
MOX-handling glove boxes at the J-MOX facility in Rokkashomura, Japan.  The system 
will use a coincident-neutron detector/analyzer, a high resolution gamma spectrometer, 
and a can ID reader. 
 
 
ANM - Alternative Nuclear Material generally refers to TRU elements other than 
plutonium, such as neptunium and americium, which have fissile isotopes and which 
could also be used in nuclear fuel. 
 
ASA-100 - Project under the United States Department of Energy NNSA Office of NA-
243, “Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Nuclear Facilities, circa 2006 - 2007. 
 
ATR (Fugen) – Advanced Test Reactor “ATR” Fugen; an experimental reactor in Japan 
that used MOX fuel, but was moderated with heavy water, and was designed with a 
“calandria” for on-load refueling. ATR MOX-fuel was some of the earliest MOX fuel 
produced in Japan in the 1970’s. 
 
AWCC - Active Well Coincident Counter; a non-destructive assay instrument used to 
determine the plutonium and uranium content of fresh TRU-fuel using coincident-neutron 
counting and analysis.  With a neutron source installed, the counter operates in an 
“active” mode to interrogate the nuclear fuel assembly by detecting the neutron induced 
fissions.  With the source removed, the counter operates in a “passive mode” to detect the 
normal fissions from the fuel assembly.  By comparing the passive to the active result, 
the counter can help determine plutonium, uranium and U-235 content.  
 
C/S - Containment and Surveillance; a term used by the IAEA to refer to safeguards 
measures that monitor nuclear material or equipment.  Containment and surveillance 
measures include seals and tamper indicating devices and video surveillance cameras. 
 
CFTC - Consolidated Fuel Treatment Center; a very large conceptual nuclear fuel 
reprocessing plant, planned by the U.S. Department of Energy, but which is expected to 
be designed, fabricated, and operated as a commercial fuel reprocessing plant.  The 
current design is expected to process 3,000 tonnes of spent fuel per year, which would be 
nearly four times the size of current large-scale reprocessing plants.  In principle, it would 
be capable of reprocessing the entire amount of spent fuel generated annually by the 
current fleet of U.S. nuclear power plants.  This conceptual facility was formerly called 
“ESD”. 
 
CoK - (also CK and CofK) – Continuity of Knowledge; a term used by the IAEA in 
safeguards for maintaining the “continuity of knowledge” on nuclear materials or 
safeguards-relevant equipment.  “Continuity of knowledge” is maintained by using video 
surveillance or mechanical or electronic sealing and tamper indicating devices. 
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CRIEPI- (Japanese) Central Reactor and Industrial Electric Power Institute; a large 
industrial collaborative institute in Japan that has been involved with designing light 
water reactors, fast reactors, and most recently pyro-reprocessing and TRU-fuel 
fabrication processes. 
 
CUMUF- cumulative “material unaccounted for”; the net accumulation of the material 
unaccounted for, as totaled over consecutive years from the time that a nuclear facility 
has been under safeguards.  On the average, the CUMUF should oscillate about zero for 
most fuel fabrication facilities.  An ever increasing CUMUF could indicate either 
significant measurement biases, or a protracted diversion of nuclear material. 
 
DA- Destructive Analysis;  the determination of the physical properties, chemical or 
isotopic composition of a sample of nuclear material using methods that consume or 
“destroy” the sample – such as IDMS, TIMS, titration, densitometry, etc. 
 
DC&E- Centralized Data Collection and Evaluation System; the acronym used to 
describe a plant-wide process control or safeguards data collection system. 
 
DCPD- Directional Canister Passage Detector; a system envisioned for the Japanese J-
MOX facility that will use unattended neutron detectors to detect and indicate the 
direction of movement of Pu-bearing MOX canisters. 
 
DI – Design Information; the acronym used to describe the design information for 
nuclear facilities that is relevant to safeguards. 
 
DIV – Design Information Verification; an activity performed by safeguards inspectors 
to verify that the facility as declared by the facility operator and national authorities is 
consistent (in size, scale and capacity) with the facility design information.  This activity 
begins with initial ground-breaking construction and continues through the life-cycle of 
the facility through to decommissioning. 
 
DMOS - Digital Multi-camera Optical Surveillance system; a standardized digital 
multiplexed video surveillance system used by the IAEA as a nuclear safeguards measure 
to monitor equipment and nuclear material. 
 
DSOS - Digital Single-camera Optical Surveillance system; a standardized digital video 
surveillance system used by the IAEA as a nuclear safeguards measure that only has one 
camera. 
 
DU - Depleted uranium; uranium with less than the naturally occurring amount of the 
fissile isotope, U-235 (<0.7 % U-235).  Depleted uranium is produced as “tails” a 
byproduct in a uranium enrichment plant.  Commercially, there is very little use for 
depleted uranium, although this could change if “breeder” fast reactors became 
commercially viable, since they use reactor core “blankets” of depleted uranium. 
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EBAL- Electronic Balance; the shorthand equipment abbreviation used by the IAEA to 
describe an electronic balance used for weighing samples or objects of safeguards 
relevance.  The gross and net weight of bulk materials under safeguards is very important 
information.  Ensuring the accuracy and authentication of this data is also of great 
importance. 
 
EBR-II – Experimental Breeder Reactor #2; a former smaller scale experimental breeder 
reactor on the U.S. DOE Idaho Site, now known as the Idaho National Laboratory “INL”. 
 
EFL - U.S. Eligible Facility List; an extensive list of nuclear fuel cycle facilities in the 
United States provided annually to the IAEA under the U.S. Voluntary Offer Safeguard 
Agreement with the IAEA.  Since the IAEA does not have the resources to inspect all of 
the nuclear fuel cycles in nuclear weapons states, such as the U.S., it randomly selects 
and rotates facilities for international safeguards inspection in nuclear weapons states.  
 
ER- Electro-refiner; the first-stage separator in a pyro-electrochemical reprocessing 
process where the uranium and plutonium is electrochemically separated from the fission 
products. 
 
EURATOM - (also Euratom); the regional safeguards inspectorate for most countries 
within the European Union. Euratom performs safeguards inspections in association with 
the IAEA.  A Partnership Approach between Euratom and the IAEA allows the IAEA to 
accept the safeguards inspections and verifications performed by Euratom. 
 
FAAS- Fuel Assembly Assay System; used at the PFPF TRU-MOX fuel fabrication 
facility in Tokaimura, Japan to determine the Pu-content of fresh MOX assemblies by 
non-destructive assay using coincident-neutron counting. 
 
FBR – Fast Breeder Reactor; a type of nuclear reactor that utilizes a “fast-neutron” 
spectrum.  If such reactors use fertile nuclear material, such as depleted uranium, in the 
outer blanket of the core, they will actually produce more plutonium in the reactor by 
transmutation than they will consume – hence the name “breeder”. 
 
FPAS- Fuel Pin Assay System; used at the PFPF TRU-MOX fuel fabrication facility in 
Tokaimura, Japan to determine the Pu-content of fresh MOX fuel pins by non-destructive 
assay using coincident-neutron counting. 
 
GBAS- Glove Box Assay System; used at the PFPF TRU-MOX fuel fabrication facility 
in Tokaimura, Japan to determine the Pu-hold-up in MOX processing glove boxes by 
non-destructive assay using coincident-neutron counting. 
 
GIF – Generation IV International Forum; the international team and project to develop 
the next generation (Generation-IV) light-water nuclear reactor, which is expected by 
design to be inherently safer and easier to construct. 
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GNEP - Global Nuclear Energy Partnership; a plan proposed by U. S. President Bush 
and the U. S. Department of Energy in 2005 to more fully develop nuclear energy 
worldwide for electrical power generation, while reducing the risk of the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. 
 
GUAM- Glove box Unattended Monitoring System; an unattended non-destructive assay 
system that will use coincident-neutron counting to determine the Pu-hold-up in glove 
boxes in the J-MOX Facility. 
 
HEU- Highly Enriched Uranium; uranium that is enriched to, or above, 20% U-235. 
 
IAEA - International Atomic Energy Agency; an organization of the United Nations 
mandated to verify the compliance of countries (states) with their safeguards agreements 
regarding their nuclear material, in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons “NPT”. 
 
IIV - Interim Inventory Verification; a periodic safeguards inspection performed by the 
IAEA to verify that the nuclear material in the inspected nuclear facility has not been 
diverted and is being operated as declared.  Historically, interim inspections for facilities 
handling plutonium have been performed monthly. 
 
IMCG- Inspector Multi-Channel Germanium spectrometer; one of the portable primary 
non-destructive assay instruments used by IAEA inspectors that utilizes a miniature 
multi-channel spectrum analyzer and high-purity Germanium detector to collect and 
analyze gamma radiation spectra. 
 
INL - The Idaho National Laboratory: one of the U.S. Department of Energy national 
laboratories that conducts research and development in nuclear fuel reprocessing, reactor 
design and nuclear waste management.  This site is in eastern Idaho near the city of Idaho 
Falls.  This site has formerly been called the Naval Reactor Testing Station “NRTS”, the 
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory “INEL” and the Idaho National Environment 
Engineering Laboratory “INEEL”. 
 
IPCA- Improved Plutonium Canister Assay System; an improved non-destructive assay 
system to be used at J-MOX for assaying the Pu-content of MOX canisters by coincident-
neutron counting and gamma spectroscopy. 
 
IPLC- IPCA Load Cell; the weighing element to be used at the IPCA assay station in the 
JMOX facility for determining the tare and gross weight of Pu-MOX canisters. 
 
J-MOX – The Japanese Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility; a fuel fabrication facility 
that is being built by Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. “JNFL” collocated on the same site with 
the Rokkashomura Reprocessing Plant “RRP”.  It will be one of the largest and most 
highly automated TRU-MOX (ceramic) fuel fabrication plants in the world. 
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JAEA - Japan Atomic Energy Agency (circa 2005 - present) , also formerly called the 
(Japan) Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation “PNC” (circa 1970's 
to mid 1990's)  and the Japan Nuclear Fuel Cycle Institute “JNC” (circa mid 1990's to 
2005).  JAEA is a governmental-industrial concern in Japan with several large nuclear 
fuel-cycle facilities involved in the reprocessing of nuclear fuel, TRU-fuel fabrication and 
testing and operation of fast reactors.  U.S. DOE has a bilateral cooperation agreement 
with JAEA in the area of advancing nuclear material safeguards. 
 
JNFL – Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd.; the private nuclear industrial consortium in Japan that 
owns and operates large-scale commercial enrichment and nuclear fuel reprocessing 
facilities near the village of Rokkashomura, in Aomori-Prefecture in northern Japan. 
 
JRC-Ispra- European Joint Research Center in Ispra, Italy.  One of the many research 
centers within the European Union that collaborate on and support research in nuclear 
material safeguards and security. 
 
JSGO - Japan Safeguards Office (circa mid 1990's to the present); the national authority 
in Japan mandated to monitor and verify compliance with domestic and international 
nuclear safety regulations and nuclear material safeguards requirements.  JSGO is under 
the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Science and Technology (abbreviated 
phonetically as “MEXT”).  JSGO was formerly known also as the Japan Nuclear Safety 
Bureau (JNSB) and the Japan Atomic Energy Bureau (JAEB). 
 
KAERI- The Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute; the primary governmental-
industrial nuclear research institute in the Republic of Korea (South Korea) with major 
research facilities in Seoul and Daejeon. KAERI has done initial development in pyro-
electrochemical processing at the ACP Facility towards the ultimate end of providing 
metallic TRU-fuel for KALIMER – the Korean Advanced Liquid Metal Experimental 
Reactor. 
 
KMP - Key Measurement Point; a point in a nuclear facility where the nuclear material is 
measured for inventory or nuclear material flow.  Key measurement points need to be 
defined for the IAEA to measure nuclear material inventory and flow in a facility subject 
to IAEA safeguards. 
 
LANL- Los Alamos National Laboratory; one of the major National Laboratories in the 
United States that supports the U.S. Department of Energy.  It has designed and 
developed a number of non-destructive assay “NDA” systems that are used by the IAEA 
for determining the uranium and plutonium content in a variety of materials and 
containers. 
 
LWR - Light Water Reactor; a conventional nuclear reactor that uses normal “light” 
water for moderating and cooling the nuclear reactor core.  Most commercial nuclear 
power plants in the world are light water reactors.  Although light water reactors are well 
known and safe to operator, they do not breed plutonium to the extent as FBRs, or 
transmute actinides to the same extent burner reactors. 
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MAGB – Material Accountancy Glove Box Assay System; a system used at the PFPF 
MOX-Fuel Fabrication Facility in Tokaimura, Japan for determining the Pu-content of 
MOX materials in the glove-box MOX transfer cart by non-destructive assay “NDA” 
using coincident-neutron counting. 
 
MBA - Material Balance Areas; areas defined in a nuclear facility for the purpose of 
nuclear material accounting.  MBA's are used both by the U.S. DOE and the IAEA. 
 
MELOX – A new large-scale commercial MOX-fuel fabrication facility built in France.  
It is subject to safeguards inspections performed by the Euratom inspectorate.  It 
incorporates a number of advanced nuclear material assay stations and utilizes automated 
monitoring of the Pu-bearing process streams to support safeguards. 
 
MOX - Mixed plutonium-uranium oxide.  This is a variant of TRU-fuel material 
developed in the 1960's to the present for recycling plutonium from reprocessed nuclear 
fuel.  MOX fuel programs had been active in the United States, Belgium, and Germany.  
They are still active in France, United Kingdom, Russia, Japan, and India.  MOX-fuel 
fabrication technology is a forerunner of TRU-fuel fabrication, which in the future may 
also use neptunium, americium, and curium. 
 
MOX-I- Siemens MOX-Fuel Facility #1, also formerly known as Alkem; an older 40 
tonne per year MOX-fuel fabrication facility formerly operated by Siemens Advanced 
Nuclear Fuels.  A highly automated and larger commercial facility called Siemens MOX-
II was built on the same site in the late 1980’s, but was never started-up or operated due 
to opposition by the German “Green” Party in the German State of Hesse. 
 
MUF - “Material Unaccounted For”; a term used in nuclear material accountancy 
(accountability) by the U.S. DOE and the IAEA that represents the difference between 
the beginning and ending inventory of nuclear material, after accounting for inventory 
changes. The value of “MUF” is monitored closely, because it could indicate a possible 
theft or diversion of nuclear material - although proper statistical interpretation of the 
“MUF” is important to determine if the value is really statistical significant. 
 
MUF-D – the MUF-D Statistic; “the material unaccounted for, difference” statistic 
compiled from the difference between operator declared and safeguards inspector 
observed values. Like “MUF” the MUF-D statistic is monitored closely, because it could 
indicate a possible theft or diversion of nuclear material - although proper statistical 
interpretation of both values is important to determine if the values are statistically 
significant. 
 
MWe - Megawatt, electric; a unit of electrical power output for any kind of electrical 
power generating station, expressed in term of millions of watts “megawatts”.  1000 
MWe is the rating of a typical large-scale commercial nuclear power station, which 
would be capable of powering a region like eastern Washington State. 
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MWth - Megawatt, thermal; a unit of thermal power output for any kind of power 
station, expressed in terms of millions of watts “megawatts”.  This is the total thermal 
power produced prior to the conversion to electrical power.  For a power station of 
approximately 30% conversion efficiency, the thermal power output required would be 
nearly three times the electrical power produced.  “MWth” is a more relevant unit of 
power output when discussing test and experimental fast reactors that do not have 
electrical power generators. 
 
NA-243 - The Office in NNSA responsible for nuclear material safeguards and nuclear 
non-proliferation issues in connection with International Treaties and Regimes. 
 
NDA - Non-Destructive Assay: a means of analyzing nuclear material for the content of 
plutonium, uranium, and other elements and isotopes without destroying the sample.  
This technique is often preferred when handling highly radiotoxic elements such as 
plutonium, because the analysis can be performed with the nuclear material remaining 
secured in containers. 
 
NDA- Non-Destructive Assay; a generic category analysis whereby a container or sample 
of nuclear material is analyzed, without consuming any of the nuclear material.  Gamma 
spectroscopy and coincident-neutron counting are some of the more commonly used 
NDA techniques for nuclear material safeguards. 
 
NMCC- (Japanese) Nuclear Material Control Center; a technical center in Japan that 
supports the Japan Safeguards Office “JSGO” in performing nuclear safeguards 
verification activities, especially those involving DA and NDA activities. 
 
NNSA - The National Nuclear Security Administration: a separate administration under 
the U.S. Department of Energy dealing with nuclear security issues on a national level. 
 
NPP- Nuclear Power Plant; the common abbreviation for a nuclear power plant or power 
station. 
 
NRTA- Near Real-Time Accounting or Accountancy; the concept of using safeguards 
relevant data in a bulk-processing plant, such as a nuclear fuel reprocessing or TRU-fuel 
fabrication plant, nearly as quickly as the data is generated, thereby providing a “Near-
Real-time” accounting or inventory of the nuclear material.  Such techniques are most 
effective when the Pu-concentration and process flow measurements are nearly 
spontaneous and collected by automated assay stations. 
 
ORIGEN - a computer code developed to estimate the radionuclide content of spent fuel 
based on the original fuel composition, neutron exposure, fuel burn-up, and cooling time.  
The ORIGEN code has been extensively improved and adapted since it was originally 
developed, but still performs best for estimating the nuclide content of spent fuel from 
commercial light water reactors. It is typically used by nuclear reactor operators to 
estimate the content of plutonium, uranium, and U-235 in spent fuel for the purpose of 
nuclear material declaration. 
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PCDF – Plutonium Conversion Demonstration Facility; a demonstration U/Pu co-
conversion facility operated by JAEA in Tokaimura that uses microwave co-denitration.  
It has been used also as a test-bed to develop NDA techniques for assaying Pu-bearing 
process materials and MOX, using systems built outside the processing gloveboxes. 
 
PFPF – Plutonium Fuel Production Facility; an industrial scale MOX-fuel fabrication 
plant operated by JAEA in Tokaimura.  PFPF produced the MOX fuel for the Advanced 
Test Reactor, Fugen, as well as the Japanese Breeder Reactors, Joyo and Monju. It has 
also produced thermal-MOX fuel for light-water reactors in Japan.  
 
PIV - Physical Inventory Verification; the physical verification and inventorying of all 
nuclear material in a facility (to the extent practical).  Physical inventory verifications are 
typically conducted several times a year by the facility operator and national authorities.  
The IAEA typically conducts a physical inventory verification once per year at most 
nuclear facilities that they inspect. 
 
PR & PP – Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection; the topics addressed by the 
PR and PP Working Group – the idea being to look at both the “proliferation resistance” 
of nuclear material, and/or nuclear processes, in the same context as the physical 
protection of nuclear material.  There is some resistance to embracing the idea of 
“proliferation resistance”, because it is a difficult value to quantify.  However, it may be 
more useful to think of proliferation resistance in relative terms. 
 
PSMC- Plutonium Scrap Multiplicity Counter; a non-destructive assay system used at 
the PFPF MOX-Fuel Fabrication Plant in Tokaimura, Japan to determine the Pu-content 
of impure MOX or MOX-scrap, using coincident-neutron counting. 
 
Pu - The chemical symbol for plutonium. 
 
PUREX- Plutonium/Uranium Reduction Extraction process;  a solvent extraction process 
used in the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel that utilizes the difference in Redox states 
between uranium and plutonium to selectively extract one or both by an organic 
extractant, such as tributyl phosphate “TBP”. 
 
Pyro – short for “pyro-processing”; a high temperature “dry” process for reprocessing 
spent nuclear fuel using either metallurgical or electrochemical methods. Such processes 
do not involve acids or organic solutions such as the aqueous “wet” PUREX process.  
However, they have only been used on a limited research and development scale and in 
the past have suffered from excessive corrosion resulting from the high process 
temperatures.  The advantage of such a process is that it could be potentially collocated 
with the Fast Reactor, as was done in the case of EBR-II at the Idaho National 
Laboratory. 
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RRP – Rokkasho(mura) Reprocessing Plant; the large-scale commercial reprocessing 
plant operated by JNFL near the village of Rokkashomura in Aomori Prefecture, northern 
Japan. 
 
“SCVS” - Shipping Cask Verification System; a prototype system being developed by 
the IAEA, through the IAEA Member State Support Programme, for the verification of 
MOX shipping casks at J-MOX. The acronym is tentative and the final name may 
change.  The system utilizes a laser-reflectometer to map and record the unique surface 
characteristics of shipping casks for identification purposes. 
 
SGTS Policy #20 – A policy established by the IAEA Division of Safeguards Technical 
Services “SGTS”; it pertains to the joint use of equipment for safeguards purposes by the 
IAEA with other parties, such as facility operators or national authorities.  As it was 
reformulated in 2006, it is highly restrictive and has had a negative impact on the sharing 
of facility operator’s instruments for safeguards purposes. 
 
SNRI- Short-Notice Random Inspection; a new inspection regime that is becoming more 
prominent.  It involves the random inspection of nuclear facilities by safeguard inspectors 
after giving “short-notice” to the facility operators and national authorities. In most cases 
where used by the IAEA, access has been granted to the facility within two hours of 
original notification.  This type of inspection is considered more effective, because the 
facility operator has little time to potentially rearrange nuclear material inventory, or 
falsify plant records.  Because of the additional burden on the facility operator, the 
frequency of this inspection is typically reduced, compared to the fixed-schedule 
inspections. 
 
SoH – “State of Health”; a signal from a remotely monitored piece of safeguards 
equipment that indicates that the signal or the equipment is OK and has not been 
tampered with. 
 
SQ - Significant Quantity; in accordance with the IAEA and international experts, the 
amount of fissile material that would be required to make a simple fission “atom” bomb.  
Per definition this is 8 kg of plutonium and 25 kg of U-235 (in the form of highly-
enriched uranium). The value of the significant quantity includes nuclear material that 
would be consumed or lost as waste in the various chemical and metallurgical processes 
in fabricating a nuclear weapon - i.e. it should not be construed to be the minimum 
amount of plutonium or highly enriched uranium required in a simple nuclear weapon. 
 
THM - (also MTHM) – Tonnes of Heavy Metal, or Metric Tonnes of Heavy Metal; the 
nominal combined mass of uranium, plutonium and actinides in spent nuclear fuel that is 
processed in a reprocessing plant.  The capacity of such a facility is normally expressed 
in terms of tonnes, THM, or MTHM per year.  A large-scale facility is on the order of 
800 tonnes per year. 
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THORP- Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant; the large-scale commercial reprocessing 
plant in the United Kingdom formerly operated by British Nuclear Fuel Ltd. “BNFL”, 
and currently operated by British Nuclear Group “BNG”. 
 
TRU - Transuranic elements; typically those elements beyond uranium in the periodic 
table of the elements, including primarily plutonium, neptunium, americium, and curium. 
Many TRU isotopes are fissile and can be used as nuclear fuel, but most TRU elements 
are long-lived if left in radioactive waste and take hundreds of thousands of years to 
decay. 
 
TRU-fuel - Nuclear fuel consisting of uranium with transuranic elements such as 
plutonium, neptunium, americium, and curium. 
 
U.S AEC - United States Atomic Energy Commission; the United States agency 
responsible for all nuclear facilities from circa 1945 to circa 1976. 
 
U.S. DOE - United States Department of Energy; a cabinet-level department in the 
executive branch of the United States government with responsibility for former U.S. 
AEC nuclear facilities and the production and safeguarding of defense-related nuclear 
materials.  Civilian nuclear facilities are regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission “NRC”.  The U.S. DOE was created circa 1978. 
 
U.S. ERDA - United States Energy Research and Development Administration; the 
United States agency responsible for nuclear facilities from circa 1976 to 1978.  Under 
President Jimmy Carter the purview of this agency expanded beyond the development 
and testing of nuclear facilities and production of nuclear material to include research and 
development in other forms of energy as well. 
 
UP-3- The Usine Process Numero 3, or “Third Processing Factory”; this is the newest 
large-scale French commercial reprocessing plant, formerly operated by Cogema, and 
now Areva, at Cape de la Hague in France.  Adjacent to UP-3 is the UP-2 facility.  Both 
reprocessing plants have a capacity of about 750 tonnes per year. 
 
UREX+ - Uranium Extraction Process +; a variation of the PUREX solvent extraction 
process in which the purified plutonium product stream is not fully separated from the 
uranium.  Additional process steps are incorporated to separate and remove high-activity 
fission products, such as technetium, strontium and cesium. 
 
VCOSS – (Also called VACOSS); a fiber optic based electro-optical sealing system used 
commonly by the IAEA.  VACOSS seals automatically record data on-board and 
document the time and date that they are attached or detached. They can also be 
electronically interrogated and remotely monitored.  Hence, they are becoming more 
important in sealing schemes replacing the old manually applied metal cap (or cup) seals. 
WPAS- Waste Package Assay System; a non-destructive assay system to be used at the 
J-MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility in Rokkashomura, Japan to determine the Pu-content of 
waste packages, using coincident-neutron counting. 
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